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1 Summary and Introduction
Norges Bank has been delegated the task of contributing to a steady growth of the Norwegian
economy by keeping ination low and stable. The goal is to keep the yearly growth in
consumer prices at 2.5 percent in the medium run, balancing the ination path with the
overall capacity utilization whenever there is a conict between the two (Norges Bank 2011),
which corresponds to exible ination targeting. The main instrument for doing this is the
sight deposit rate (foliorenten) on commercial banks overnight deposits in Norges Bank,
which a¤ects money market rates through banksmarginal funding costs.
The policy rate decisions are based on analyses done with NEMO (the Norwegian Econ-
omy Model), as well as on general assessments about the state of the economy. NEMO is a
large New Keynesian DSGE model representing the Norwegian mainland economy in a sim-
plied and stylized manner. Uncertainty about the true structure of the economy is always
an issue, and it is by no means certain that NEMO is the best possible description of it. A
way to accommodate this uncertainty is to set the interest rate in a robust manner, meaning
that monetary policy achieves a satisfactory level of macroeconomic stabilization also when
the economy is highly di¤erent from the NEMO economy. Such policies that work well across
a wide range of structural models are robust to model uncertainty.1
However, robustness comes at the cost of optimality. Optimal policy is ne-tuned to the
dynamics of a specic model, and does not perform well for completely di¤erent economies,
as intuition suggests and many analyses show (e.g. Mathis Mæhlum 2012). A policy reaction
function utilizing less model-specic information performs better on average across models,
but naturally worse in each separate model, yet not substantially worse, as my results show.
Such a restricted information rule is called a simple interest rate rule and is said to be robust
if it performs well across a large variety of models.
Simple rules are commonly used by central banks in the conduct of monetary policy, of
which there is thorough proof. Janet Yellen in the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System indicated that she uses "the Taylor rule" (see Chapter 2.3 for a description of the
rule) to provide her with a rough sense of whether or not the funds rate is at a reasonable
level(FOMC transcripts, January 31-February 1, 1995). The popularity of simple interest
rate rules is due to their applicability and the way they are intuitive and communicative to
the general public, but most of all their robustness properties.
Norges Bank also uses simple rules to cross-check the policy derived from NEMO, among
other the above-mentioned Taylor rule. The actual performance of these rules in the Norwe-
gian economy has not been properly investigated, and little work has been done on robust
1See for example Hammond (2012) and Svensson (2000) for details.
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simple rules.2 A large share of the international literature has however found that the Taylor
rule performs quite poorly, and in particular it appears not to be hard-hitting enough (Rude-
busch and Svensson 1998). This calls for a better robust rule for the Norwegian economy,
which is the goal of my work to nd. By analyzing the properties and performance of a
number of di¤erent policy rules, I seek a rule tailored to the Norwegian economy that yields
a satisfactory outcome in a variety of models.
I use ve di¤erent models for the Norwegian economy, with NEMO as the benchmark
model: two extensions of NEMO  "Credit NEMO" with a credit market incorporated, and
a backward-looking version "Policy NEMO"  as well as a small open model economy, the
"Leitemo-Gali-Monacelli" (LGM) model (Leitemo 2006), and a slightly modied version of
the macroeconometric model "Norwegian Aggregated Model" (NAM) by Bårdsen and Ny-
moen (2009), which is a model in "the Norwegian tradition" similar to KVARTS used by
the Statistics Norway and RIMINI previously used by Norges Bank. NAM di¤ers substan-
tially from the other four, and drives much of the results in this thesis, which gives sound
justications for including it in the set of models. All of the models prescribe highly diver-
gent reaction functions for the nominal interest rate, and therefore constitute a good and
wide-ranging base for robustness analyses.
I mostly base my work on the paper by Taylor and Wieland (2009) on robust simple
interest rate rules. As they do, I rst nd the optimal coe¢ cients in three specications of
a simple interest rate rule in each seperate model: one rule where the nominal interest rate
responds only to ination uctuations and the output gap; one where the lagged interest rate
is added in order to allow for more gradual adjustments, and one with the lagged output gap
as well.
The optimization procedure is done in MatLab with the software Dynare3 and a search
algorithm developed Junior Maih4 for internal use in Norges Bank.
My results show that since the optimized rules are ne-tuned to the dynamics of the rule-
generating model, they yield remarkably less stability in the competing models. In particular
miserable is the rule with only two variables from the LGMmodel applied in NAM, generating
instability. There is also a strong conict between the prescribed three variable rules in CN
and NAM.
2There has, of course, been some research on robust monetary policy in the Norwegian economy, of which
the paper by Akram and Nymoen (2009) is a good representation. The authors investigate the consequences
of trading o¤ the empirical validity of a model against other desirable properties. Basing policy on a suite
of models or assuming the model uncertainty to be higher than justied, can potentially create large losses.
Because the three models in the paper entail widely di¤erent monetary policy responses to shocks, conducting
robust monetary policy in the face of model uncertainty is quite costly.
3Free download available from http://www.dynare.org.
4Thanks to Junior Maih for provision of coding for the solution algortihm.
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In order to improve the achievement of the simple rules, I look at "Bayesian rules" where
an average of the outcomes in the models is optimized in order to nd the interest rate rule
that best stabilizes this "model-mean". The Bayesian rules are more robust as they reduce
the variability in each model compared to the rst-best rule from another model. They
also perform well in the models that they have not been optimized over, NEMO and Policy
NEMO.
Robustness properties are evaluated using the relative increase in loss in a model stemming
from the interchange of two policy rules translated into variability of ination, a measure
called Implied Ination variability Premium (IIP) (Kuester and Wieland 2010). My results
show a large dispersion of IIPs in the models, with the Bayesian rules naturally generating
the lowest average IIP. In particular low IIPs are yielded by the rules where the relative
importance of NAM in the optimization is tuned down. I nd that rules that respond to last
periods rate, ination deviations from target and the current output gap is the most robust
class of rules.
Another robustness tool used is fault tolerance (FT) (Levin and Williams 2003), where
the relative increase in loss resulting from gradually varying the optimal value of a coe¢ cient
in a policy rule is displayed in a graph. FT is both used to measure to which extent a rule
is robust towards small changes in the parameters, and how much a model is tolerant to
di¤erent policies. The three-parameter interest rate rules is proved to be the most robust,
and are hence the best to insure against model uncertainty with. NEMO and Policy NEMO
are the most fault tolerant models, closely followed by CN, and NAM is the least tolerant.
At the end of the thesis I present what I refer to as "the Golden Interest Rule" (GIR),
which is the rule that do best on average across the models. Through evaluating IIPs and
FT of the di¤erent optimized rules, I found the properties of the best-performing rules,
and tried several combinations of the parameter values that appeared to be optimal. GIR
is as expected, a three-parameter rule that allows for a moderate degree of interest rate
smoothing, yet not too much due to NAM. The long run responses to economic disturbances
are substantially above the original Taylor rule, in particular three to ination deviations
from target and one and a half to GDP movements from trend. These strong reactions give
su¢ cient stabilization of the real economy in all models considered.
In the rst chapter I explain some of the theoretical background for my thesis. Then
I describe the models, followed by a brief discussion of their transmission mechanisms of
monetary policy. Chapter 5 is about the method used. Results from the optimization of
simple rules is then presented, and robustness results follows in Chapter 7. In Chapter 8 I
propose the "Golden Interest Rule". I end with some concluding remarks, before references
and appendices with results left out of the main text.
3
2 Theory
In this chapter I rst discuss some features of ination targeting and its rationale, before I
describe some of the theoretical background of it. I then explain the use of simple instrument
rules versus conducting optimal monetary policy, and eventually present a way to insure
against model uncertainty.
2.1 Ination targeting
Maintaining stability and growth in GDP is one of the main goals of all macroeconomic
policy. When output grows at a steady pace, rms change their production gradually, with
few res and hires, such that workers experience little variation in their labour supply. High
unemployment is harmful for individuals and for the society as a whole, and being unemployed
has costs beyond the pure economic ine¢ ciencies resulting from resources not being fully
exploited. Monetary policy seeks to establish the desired stability through nominal variables,
in particular ination. A stable ination and credible monetary policy anchors ination
expectations, which is crucial in wage and price setting and thus in the economic variables
directly a¤ecting households.
Norway is a exible ination targeting regime, which is commonly believed to be a way
of conducting monetary policy that stabilizes ination and the real economy in a satisfactory
manner. 27 countries are today considered fully ination targeting regimes, and many other
are at the outset of becoming one. Ination targeting is a framework for interest rate setting
that is characterized by a pre-eminent, explicit target for the ination rate in the medium
run, i.e. a specied number that the CPI or whichever ination measure is used, should
return to after disturbances to the economy, at a horizon not too far into the future, usually
around 1-3 years.
The regime isexible when the monetary authority is not only concerned about stabilizing
ination around its target, but also about the real economy, i.e. having a direct preference
for ensuring a stable growth of GDP and a normal resource utilization, beyond the e¤ects
working through the ination. The case of a strict ination targeter is someone who solely
cares about ination variability, and is sometimes referred to as a pure "ination nutter"
(King 1997).
Monetary policy in an ination targeting regime is conducted by a politically and legally
independent central bank. The central bank uses macroeconomic models and judgements of
extra-model information about the state of the economy to make conditional forecasts of the
economic variables on which the interest rate decision is based. Because policy uses forecasts
of the key variables, ination targeting could well be termed "Ination-forecast targeting"
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(Svensson 2000), as in the case of Norges Bank.
In most ination targeting central banks the forecasts, as well as predictions of the in-
tended future interest rate path and further macroeconomic assessments are regularly re-
leased in monetary policy reports. Norges Bank publishes such reports three times a year
(e.g. Norges Bank 2011, Norges Bank 2012). Policy is state-contingent such that it has the
exibility to respond to short run uctuations from the path towards the ination goal, and
these deviations must be justied in the reports.
In an ination targeting regime the approach to monetary policy is candid and open, and
it is easy for the public to understand the rationale for the interest rate decisions, since the aim
is clear (returning to the ination target in the medium run) and the underlying foundation is
thoroughly documented in the reports. When the policy reaction function is comprehensive
and systematic, agentsexpectations about future interest rate and ination developments
are kept stable and consistent with the goal. Actual ination is then maintained at the
target level, in the absence of macroeconomic disturbances, because expectations is a central
driver of it. There is indeed evidence of reduced volatility in short-term market interest rates
on the days that Norges Bank publishes the interest rate decision, suggesting that precise
communication of policy intentions improves agentsunderstanding of the reaction pattern
(Holmsen et al. 2008). Transparency about all goals and aspects of monetary policy is
crucial, as strongly argued by Woodford (2005).
The preferences of an ination targeting central bank is modelled as a loss function where
the arguments are the variability of the variables that it seeks to stabilize, usually GDP and
consumer prices. In this regard, ination targeting can be interpreted as optimizing behaviour
by the central bank, where it commits to the policy prescribed by the minimization of the
objective.
A large literature exists on whether strict or exible ination targeting, or other monetary
policy regimes, is the most appropriate. Svensson (2000) concludes that a exible ination
targeting regime results in less variability in other macroeconomic variables than the CPI by
reacting more gradually and to a longer horizon of the ination forecasts than strict ination
targeting. It leads to considerable stabilization of GDP, as well as of the real exchange rate
since the e¤ects of the exchange rate movements on other variables than ination are included
in the interest rate setting through the arguments in the policy objective. E¤ects further into
the future than the direct exchange rate e¤ect stemming from lower imported ination are
taken into account. This makes the policy approach particularly suitable for open economies
like the Norwegian.
Hence, the exible ination targeting regime applied in Norway appears to be sensible.
Woodford even recommended that the Federal Reserve adopts this monetary policy strat-
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egy: "A forecast-targeting procedure similar to that of the Norges Bank could plausibly
be introduced as a framework intended to ensure that policy conforms to the mandates of
the Federal Reserve Act and to make this conformity more evident to Congress and to the
public." (Woodford 2007, p. 22-23)
2.2 A role for monetary policy
New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)5 models have been com-
monly adapted by central banks all around the world as the main analytical tool, like NEMO
in Norges Bank. They are macroeconomic models based on microeconomic principles, and
consist of equations describing economic relations derived from rst-order conditions of in-
tertemporal problems facing consumers and rms. The explicit modelling of rational opti-
mizing decision makerspreferences makes it possible to analyze economic e¤ects and welfare
implications of policy changes. The structural nature of the models prevents them from being
vulnerable to the Lucascritique (Lucas 1976), which says that agents change their behavior
in reaction to policy changes and therefore alter the macroeconomic relations. New Keyne-
sian models are able to explain aggregate economic phenomena, such as economic growth
and business cycles. They also t data well and have satisfying forecasting properties.
New Keynesian theory builds on Real Business Cycle models, but have incorporated
elements from the Keynesian framework, thereby the name New Keynesian. By including
nominal rigidities in the form of price and wage stickiness, monetary policy has an e¤ect on
the real economy in the short run. This is in contrast to the Real Business Cycle theory
where it is at best superuous, and may indeed be counterproductive because business cycles
are only e¢ cient responses to productivity shocks (Galí 2008). The nominal rigidities are
commonly modelled using the canonical framework of staggered price setting laid out by
Calvo (1983). In this framework, prot maximizing rms with identical technology produce
a di¤erentiated nal good and set prices as a markup on the market clearing price that would
have been the result in a completely competitive market. Nevertheless, they can not adjust
prices as often as they desire due to constraints on the frequency of price revisions. There
is only a certain fraction of the rms that are allowed to update their prices every period,
resulting in sluggish responses of prices to shocks. The optimizing rms are drawn completely
at random such that the expected (or average) duration of a price equals the inverse of the
share of rms "winning the lottery" each period.
5The term DSGE models has in modern macroeconomics been closely (albeit, somewhat falsely) connected
to New Keynesianism. New Keynesian models are indeed dynamic and stochastic models that provide a
general equilibrium solution, but the converse is not necessarily true. Many dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models are not New Keynesian, for example the model NAM described below.
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There are also other ways of modelling price sluggishness, and the method proposed by
Rotemberg (1982) is used in NEMO. It di¤ers from the Calvo pricing scheme in that all
rms set prices optimally every period based on complete information. Revising prices is
costly, and price setters must be forward-looking and base current prices on expectations as
well as on last periods prices. The adjustment costs are modelled as quadratic deviations
between the prices in two successive periods. At the aggregate level and up to a rst order
approximation, Rotemberg and Calvo pricing schemes are however equal (Lombardo and
Vestin 2007).
Due to sticky prices there are two sources of ine¢ ciencies in the canonical New Keynesian
economy, namely uctuations in the average output gap of rms, and price dispersion between
rms. The output gap is the di¤erence between the actual production level and the e¢ cient
level. The latter is the production level that would have been realized if prices were fully
exible, such that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) is equal to the marginal rate of
transformation (MRT).
When there is monopolistic competition in a market, the markup on the prices set by
rms creates a wedge between MRS and MRT. This ine¢ ciency can however be completely
o¤set by a proper subsidy. But even with such an optimal subsidy in place, production will
in general di¤er from the e¢ cient level because prices and thus real wages do not fully adjust
to changes in the marginal product of labour as shocks hit the economy. This leads to a
suboptimal allocation of labour inputs and aggregate production level, which give monetary
policy a motive for stabilizing the economy through responding to movements in the output
gap. If, for example, a temporary positive demand shock occurs, production increases, and
in consequence marginal costs go up and therefore also prices. But since prices cannot adjust
instantaneously to the new marginal costs, monetary policy should increase the interest rate
as a response to the positive output gap. A higher nominal interest rate increases real rates,
thereby reducing demand and moving the economy faster back to steady state. This lowers
the variability in the output gap and ination.
Price dispersion between rms due to staggered price setting results in ination because
re-optimizing rms choose a price that di¤ers from the average price in the last period. When
rms with equal production technology face di¤erent output prices, they produce at di¤erent
output levels. This leads to an ine¢ cient goods combination, given that the consumers have a
"taste for variety"6. The dispersion of production levels can be alleviated if monetary policy
seeks to stabilize price ination, because rms would then have no incentives to change prices
and hence produce at the same level.
6Preferences for variation in consumption is ensured through a constant elasticity of substitution function
for the aggregation of the consumption good.
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In the most basic New Keynesian model with no real rigidities, complete ination stabi-
lization is optimal because no uctuations in prices automatically stabilize output as well.
This is sometimes referred to as "the divine coincidence", namely that the trade-o¤ between
ination and output gap stabilization is absent when monetary policy stabilizes the marginal
cost of rms at a level consistent with their desired markup, given the prices in place. No
rms change their prices if they expect the policy to last forever, so the output gap remains
closed and ination stays at the target level.
However, the presence of imperfect competition in labour markets and sticky nominal
wages renders pure price ination stabilization as suboptimal. Di¤erences in wages across
workers lead to an ine¢ cient allocation of labour, making production e¢ ciency improvements
possible. When wages respond slowly to macroeconomic distortions, the central bank should
seek to stabilize a balance between price ination, wage ination and output gap movements,
since they all lead to ine¢ cient resource utilization. Despite that, optimal policy can well be
approximated by stabilizing a weighted average of wage and price ination (in addition to
the output gap), where the weights depend on relative price and wage stickiness (Galí 2008).
This leaves (averaged) ination and output gap as the two arguments entering the central
banks loss function.
In the staggered price-setting framework above, the slow response of prices and wages
to economic disturbances is the central explanation for business cycle uctuations. The
resulting price dynamics creates a stabilizing role for monetary policy of the real economy
beyond nominal variables. Movements in the policy rate lead to altered ination expectations,
but since agents know that prices and wages do not adjust immediately in proportion to
the interest rate change, the real interest rate will be a¤ected, and thus consumption and
investments, which in turn a¤ects employment and production.
Albeit, in the long run all variables return to their steady state values or natural levels
because wages and prices fully adjust, and monetary policy becomes neutral. Consequently,
it is the presence of sticky prices and wages that makes e¢ cient responses to shocks and
welfare enhancing macroeconomic policies possible:
Even though nominal rigidities theoretically gives monetary policy a stabilizing role, it is,
however, not obvious that it does so in the real world. But as Gali (2008) summarizes, there
is ample evidence of both nominal rigidities and monetary non-neutrality from empirical
studies and estimations. Signicant e¤ects of monetary policy on real variables have been
found, which supports the theory that monetary policy can alleviate economic ine¢ ciencies
that arises with nominal rigidities, in contrast to the ideas of the RBC advocates.7
7The e¤ects of monetary policy on real variables are of course di¢ cult to identify: changes in the policy
rate are usually entirely or partly results of changes in the variables, and the causality thus goes in the
opposite direction of the one to be estimated.
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A low and stable ination rate is also desirable for other reasons than the theoretical
e¢ ciency arguments in the New Keynesian models. A small positive ination rate renders
real wage adjustments possible without adjusting nominal wages. It appears self-evident that
frequent nominal wage increases accompanied by equal increases in the consumer prices are
preferred by workers to a constant nominal and real wage (due to the "illusion of money"
(Fisher 1928)). A positive ination target also helps to prevent the nominal interest rate
from hitting the "zero lower bound"8, in which communication about future policy inten-
tions becomes especially important. By credibly committing to higher ination rates in the
future and thereby inuencing expectations about future consumer prices, the central bank
stimulates the economy today and thus mitigates the e¤ects of the lower bound.
When equilibrium ination is positive, the nominal interest rate supporting this equi-
librium will also be positive, because it is the real interest that a¤ects economic agents
decisions, and depending on the size of this equilibrium real rate, there will be more room
for monetary stimuli in economic downturns.
Yet, high ination rates could create macroeconomic instabilities by causing large and
varying ination expectations, rent-seeking and irrational behavior, uncertainty about the
conduct of monetary policy, and undermine the role of money, etc. Some ination is prefer-
able, but there is no consensus about the optimal level. The goal of Norges Bank is to keep
the growth in the consumer price index in the medium run at 2.5 percent, but other central
banks have di¤erent ination targets, most of them below the Norwegian. The European
Central Bank, Sveriges Riksbank and Bank of England all have goals of 2 percent. A 2 per-
cent ination target is commonly viewed to be su¢ cient to avoid signicant macroeconomic
instabilities of the type explained above (Taylor and Williams 2010).
2.3 Simple interest rate rules
"Why does the Bank make things so complicated? Why doesnt it just fol-
low the Taylor rule?" [Interruption by a distinguished macro economist at an
American university, when Lars E. O. Svensson was presenting Bank of Swedens
approach to ination targeting.] (Svensson 2000: p. 1)
Setting the policy rate is a demanding engagement. There are often several conicting
considerations in the evaluation procedure, and it is important to have a consistent and
comprehensive way of doing it. There are two main approaches to the conduct of monetary
policy: Optimal policy or simple instrument rules. Optimal policy refers to when the central
8A negative nominal interest rate is obviously not possible for more than very short periods of time, as it
could lead to a collapse of the bank sector if all agents withdrew their deposits.
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bank sets the policy rate in order to minimize a specic objective, like Equation 2 below.
Simple instrument rules are, as the name suggests, easy rules of thumb to be followed by the
monetary authority. The simple rules consist of a few selected variables that the nominal
interest rate should respond to uctuations in, and can hence be implemented without further
knowledge about the economys functioning or the realization of shocks. The rules are thus
robust to all kinds of uncertainties, in particular model uncertainty, which is also the main
advantage of such rules. In addition, they make monetary policy transparent and predictable
due to their simple structure.
The original and famous "Taylor rule" (Taylor 1993) is a classical example of a simple
interest rate rule. The rule dictates that the nominal interest rate moves 1.5 percentage point
when ination deviates one percentage point from the ination target and 0.5 percentage
point when output deviates one percentage from its trend or potential level:
rTt = 1:5t + 0:5yt, (1)
where t is year-on-year ination and yt is the output gap, and the targets for ination and
output are set to zero for simplicity.
As highlighted by Taylor, the crucial feature of the interest rate feedback rule is that it
dictates monetary authorities to "lean against the wind" in the sense that if the output gap
is positive or ination rises above target, the nominal interest rate is increased in order to
dampen economic overheating.
The principle that the nominal interest rate should react more than one-to-one to ina-
tionary movements in order to avoid indeterminacy of the price level, has become known
as "The Taylor principle" (Woodford 2001). This principle should always be followed when
instrument rules are used to set the interest rate. For example, for an increase in demand
without any change in economic fundamentals (e.g. a sunspot shock), production and mar-
ginal costs increase, creating inationary pressure. If the nominal interest rate did not
respond enough to the rise in ination, the real interest rate would actually go down and the
e¤ects on the economy would be the opposite of the intended, justifying the initial increase in
consumption. Therefore, monetary policy must be designed so that this type of self-fullling
prophecies cannot happen. Taylor (1993) and others (e.g. Clarida et al. 2000) argues that
the Fed did not follow the Taylor principle before Volcker was appointed as Chairman for the
Federal Reserve in 1979, and that this is the reason for the great ination and macroeconomic
instability in the USA in the 1960s and 1970s.
Responding to ination and output solely though, without taking all other available
information into consideration, may seem too simple and sub-optimal. This is indeed the case,
but the two variables are such good indicators of the state of the economy that reacting to
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movements in them yields su¢ cient macroeconomic stabilization. Taking the robustness and
transparency qualities of simple policy rules into account, they seem like a good alternative
to optimal monetary policy.
It has been shown that simple rules do describe actual monetary policy in most countries
quite well and t data in a satisfying manner (Kuester and Wieland 2010), which was actually
the main goal of rule (1). Taylors famous paper was meant as a contribution to the discussion
of optimal monetary policy with discretion versus using a time-invariant policy rule. The
proposed rule is able to explain the Federal funds rate movements remarkably well from
the 1970s to 1992. Thus, the policy conducted by the Fed could be approximated by such
a simple rule. It was, however, not intended as a rule for the actual conduct of monetary
policy, and it is unlikely that policy makers literally follow the simple rules. But they anyhow
work well as a benchmark for assessing monetary policy.
2.4 Optimal monetary policy
Ination targeting could well be described as optimizing behaviour of the central bank, in the
sense that it takes all relevant information into account and responds with the policy rate to
shocks in order to minimize the expected value of some objective. The central bank commits
to the prescribed policy for all future periods, and acts as if it made the commitment a long
time ago by treating all periods equal. This is referred to as conducting optimal monetary
policy in a timeless perspective.9
The objective function for most ination targeting central banks consists of the uncondi-
tional variance of ination, output gap and change in the nominal interest rate:
Lt = Et[(t   )2 + y(yt   y)2 + r(rt   rt 1)2], (2)
where  is the ination target, y is output target or trend, and rt is the nominal interest
rate. Et is the mathematical unconditional expectation operator, and 
y and r represent the
central banks relative preferences for output gap stabilization and interest rate smoothing,
respectively.
The arguments entering the loss function and the relative weights assigned each of them
is frequently debated in the literature, but most seem to agree that some concerns for output
and interest rate smoothing should be included in addition to ination. As argued above,
9I refer to the loss generated by optimal policy as "Ramsey loss" in order to distinguish it from "optimal
simple rule loss", even though the policies are not the same. The di¤erence is that Ramsey policy exploits
the gain in the rst period after a shock by promising to overshoot the ination target in future periods and
thereby reduce current ination due to the forward-looking behaviour of price setters. The losses are however
the same when they are calculated from theoretical variances and the discount factor of the central bank is
unity, such that all periods are treated equal, which is what I use.
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the preferences of the monetary authority should be to maintain low ination variability and
a steady output growth in order to secure a stable economic environment, and it appears
natural to set the policy rate in a manner that minimizes deviations of ination and GDP
away from target or trend.
Including the output gap has been found to be necessary in order to attain robust mon-
etary policy (Levin and Williams 2003), which is the goal of this thesis. Consequently,
excluding output from the loss function appears to be counterproductive.10
By including the variability of the change in the nominal interest rate in the loss function,
the central bank ensures that the interest rate is moved gradually and with caution, which
is preferable when there is general uncertainty about the structure of the economy and the
e¤ects of monetary policy (Levin et al. 1999). It appears intuitively correct that economic
agents prefer predictability in the direction of movements of the nominal interest rate, rather
than frequent small uctuations around a constant level, which could be the case if the level of
the interest rate entered as an argument11. Such frequent adjustments in alternate directions
may cause policy makers to appear uninformed and whimsical, and undermine the role of
monetary policy as an anchor for nominal variables. As explained in Holmsen et al. (2008),
using the rst di¤erence of the policy rate delivers reasonable paths for the nominal interest
rate: "paths that do not look unacceptable to the policy maker at rst glance". In addition,
Svensson (2000) nds that the case of strict CPI targeting does not converge unless a small
weight on interest rate smoothing is added to the loss function.
Further, interest rate smoothing12 leads to higher macroeconomic stabilization by pro-
viding a better control over long term rates which are the main driving forces of ination
expectations, actual ination and production. When movements in the policy rate are ex-
pected to be long-lived, as in the case of gradualism in interest rate setting, the e¤ect on
long term rates is signicantly larger. A smooth interest rate path makes real variables move
in an even fashion, preventing undesirable jumps in consumption and labour. Besides, sub-
stantial and sudden changes in the interest rate amplify nancial market volatilities, which
may lead to instabilities in the real economy. Taylor and Wieland (2009) and many others
include the change in the nominal interest rate in the monetary policy objective. Because
10Taylor and Wieland (2009) and Kuester and Wieland (2008) nd, however, that the insurance against
model uncertainty can be done at a relatively low cost even if the objective function does not contain any
output stabilization concern.
11It is, of course, possible to include both the level of and change in the nominal interest rate. This is in
fact done in Norges Banks most recent monetary policy report (Norges Bank 2012), in order to mitigate the
risk of a buildup of nancial imbalances, where the deviations from a "normal" interest rate level is one of
the arguments.
12I shall use the term "interest rate smoothing" to refer to a policy reaction function where there is a high
degree of persistence in the nominal interest rate, i.e. that the coe¢ cient on the lagged interest rate is large,
and not as a policy that leads to a smooth interest rate path of other reasons.
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low interest rate volatility is found in data, preferences for interest rate smoothing by policy
makers appears to be justied empirically (Levin et al. 1999).
For all these reasons it is wise to conduct monetary policy with caution and "stodginess",
it being due to preferences for interest smoothing in a loss function or used in a monetary
policy reaction function.
2.5 Robustifying monetary policy
In order to avoid disastrous outcomes and reduce the risk of total failure of monetary policy,
but without switching from optimal policy to a simple interest rate rule, it is possible to
robustify optimal policy by extending the loss function with a fourth argument, namely
deviations from the interest rate implied by a simple instrument rule (Ilbas et al. 2012):
Lt = (1  )((t   )2 + y(yt   y)2 + r(rt   rt 1)2) + (rt   rSRt )2, (3)
where rSRt is the nominal interest rate that would have been set if the central bank followed
the simple rule SR. This rule would be a type of rule like Equation 1, which does not perform
outstandingly in any single model, but does on average quite well and thus serves as an
insurance against model uncertainty.
Optimal policy and simple instrument rules are combined in a framework that robusties
monetary policy. As argued in Ilbas et al. (2012), this modied loss function is realistic,
exible and sensible. Central banks can easily adopt to it and there are no limits to which or
how many simple rules that can be included. The last term in (3) could easily be substituted
or modied when new knowledge about robust simple instrument rules is obtained or as
experiences about which rules best serve the robustness purposes develop. The authors
further argue that simple rules are not realistic since central banks rarely follow them in a
strict manner. Conducting optimal monetary policy gives no room for simple rules which are
proved to be a lot more robust. Thus, a combination of the two monetary policy approaches
appears to be a good solution.
Robustness is a big topic within monetary policy research, and there are numerous papers
discussing di¤erent ways of insuring against mis-specications, and model and parameter
uncertainties. However, the method developed by Ilbas et al. (2012) is as far as we know
the only approach combining optimal policy with a simple interest rate rule. The large
literature on parameter uncertainty and model mis-speciation supplies ways of robustifying
when there are uncertainties about details of a specic model, but not if the true economy
is completely di¤erent. As Levin and Williams (2003, p. 958) notes:
"...the results suggest that simply designing a rule to be robust in the neigh-
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borhood of a given reference model does not ensure that the rule will perform
robustly in competing reference models."
Therefore, by extending the loss function with a small weight on deviations from a simple
interest rate rule, the central bank insures against uncertainties of several forms, without
sacricing much. In this thesis I search for the best simple rule(s) to modify the loss function
of Norges Bank with. The rule(s) I end up with should in particular do well in the models that
Norges Bank seeks to insure against disastrous outcomes in, i.e. NAM, as optimal NEMO
policy yields instability in this model (Mathis Mæhlum 2012).
3 Models
Following is a description of the models used in this thesis. Since it is part of a larger
project on which my fellow student Mathis Mæhlum also works, we have cooperated on this
chapter. He has written the parts describing the LGM model and NAM, and I have written
about the NEMO models. He does however not consider "Policy NEMO", so this model is
only included in my analysis. I hence use four main models, but extend to ve whenever
appropriate. Credit NEMO, NAM and the LGM model are those I refer to as "reference
models" because they are the models I compare NEMO with. The models di¤er in many
important aspects, although four are New Keynesian and all are DSGE models, albeit with
highly di¤erent specications.
Lower case letters represent the log-deviation from a variables steady state value, except
from growth rates and interest rates.
3.1 NEMO
The Norwegian Economy Model, NEMO (Brubakk et al. 2006), is a New Keynesian DSGE
model used by Norges Bank for policy evaluation and forecasting . It is a model of a small
open economy consisting of two countries, home and foreign, interpreted as Norway and its
trading partners, and two sectors, one producing intermediate goods and one producing a
single nal good. The model economy is a representation of the Norwegian mainland economy,
with the petroleum sector entering as an exogenous process for oil investments. The foreign
economy is modelled symmetrically to the home economy, but enter as exogenous variables,
such that Norway has no inuence on its trading partners.
All variables in NEMO are detrended with a common stochastic growth trend. We use a
rst-order Taylor approximation of the model.
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The economy consists of a continuum of innitely lived households that are divided into
two types, savers and spenders, who both supply labour services to the intermediate goods
sector. The share slc of spenders are rule of thumb consumers and spend their total labour
income every period, whereas the share (1   slc) of savers have access to a credit market
and choose consumption and saving plans that maximize expected utility over the lifetime
subject to a budget constraint, which leads to the following Euler equation:
csat = f191Etc
sa
t+1 + f192c
sa
t 1   f193Et frt   t+1g   f194Zt + f195zUt , (4a)
where csat is consumption done by savers, Et(rt   t+1) the real interest rate, Zt a shock
to the growth trend and zUt a preference shock raising the marginal utility of consumption
relative to leisure. Savers are forward-looking and wish to smooth consumption over time,
and due to habit persistence, current consumption also depends on last periods consumption.
A temporary rise in growth reduces the value of (detrended) consumption and households
thereby postpone consumption.
Forward-looking households invest in domestic and foreign bonds, receive all dividends
from rms, pay lump sum taxes and set nominal wages taking rms labour demand into
account. They have some degree of monopoly power in the labour market such that the
resulting wages are above the competitive wages, whereas spenders receive the average wage
rate of the savers and simply supply the amount of labour demanded from them at this wage.
There are quadratic costs of adjusting wages that makes wage growth, wt , respond sluggishly
to shocks, which thus depends on past and future wage growth, deviations of the actual wage
from the optimal wage (equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure), (wt   mrst), and the degree of bargaining power represented by the substitution
elasticity between labour inputs, !t:
Wt =

1 + 
Et
W
t+1 +
1
1 + 
Wt 1   f231(wt  mrst)  f232!t. (4b)
Production of the nal good, A, is done using a combination of imported and domestically
produced intermediates, respectively M and Q, with the shares given by the degree of "home
bias", i.e. the relative preferences for input factors produced in the home economy. The nal
good is used for consumption, C, capital investments in the intermediate sector, I, government
spending, G, and oil investments, IOIL. The only source of imports in the economy are
the imported intermediate goods, T*, and exports consist purely of domestically produced
intermediate goods, M*.
In the intermediate goods sector, monopolistically competitive rms produce di¤eren-
tiated goods tt, utilizing capital services, kt = ut + kt 1   Zt , and labour in a Constant
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Figure 1: The production structure of NEMO. The gure is taken from Brubakk et al. (2006).
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function:
tt = f61(lt + z
L
t ) + f62kt, (4c)
where zLt is a labour augmenting productivity shock that temporary increases the level of
production, and drives the exogenous total factor productivity.
The amount of capital services depends on the capital stock and the utilization rate,
whereas the stock itself is determined by investments done one period earlier and capital
depreciation. There are convex adjustment costs of changing both the level of the investment
to capital ratio, (invt kt 1), and the rate of change in this ratio, which together with variable
capital utilization and habit persistence are the real rigidities in NEMO. The investment to
capital ratio is thus a slowly moving variable that reacts positively to increases in the expected
real return to capital, EtrKt+1, and negatively to the expected real interest rate since it reduces
the discounted value of the return. A somewhat simplied version of the investment Euler
equation:
invt kt 1 = f111(invt 1 kt 2)+f112Et finvt+1   ktg f113Et

(rt   t+1)  f114rKt+1
	
+shockinvt .
(4d)
Intermediate rms set prices as a markup above the competitive price, and prices respond
sluggishly to shocks due to convex adjustment costs à la Rotemberg (1982). Ination on inter-
mediate goods, Qt , increases with real marginal costs and decreases with a cost push shock
represented by the substitution elasticity between the domestically produced intermediate
goods, Ht , by the following Phillips curve:
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Qt =

(1 + )
Et
Q
t+1 +
1
(1 + )
Qt 1 + f131(mct   pQt )  f132Ht . (4e)
Prices on the exported factor inputs are set in the local currency at the destination where
they are sold, and evolves in a similar way to domestic intermediate prices. Imported ination
has a corresponding Phillips curve, meaning that foreign intermediate good producing rms
set domestic prices in an identical way to domestic rms.
The real exchange rate, st, is governed by a version of the standard uncovered interest
rate parity (UIP) condition, stating that in optimum the expected return on domestic and
foreign bonds must be equal, with an exogenous risk premium, zBt , of which a positive
realization means that the return to foreign bonds relative to domestic bonds increases, i.e.
that foreigners demand a higher real return for a given exchange rate:
st = f201Etst+1   Et frt   t+1g+ Et

rt   t+1
	
+ zBt . (4f)
The government purchases nal goods nanced through a lump-sum tax, invests in the
petroleum sector and sets the short term nominal interest rate. Government spending and oil
investments are exogenous variables. The other exogenous variables include domestic shock
processes and all the foreign variables except export prices (Norwegian import prices) and
are modelled as AR(1) processes with a white noise shock:
zt = zt 1 + "t. (4g)
The model is closed by assuming market clearing to ensure that demand equals supply
for the nal good, intermediate goods, labour, and domestic bonds.
We use the estimated version of NEMO as in the Monetary Policy Report no. 3/2011
(Norges Bank 2011).
3.1.1 Policy NEMO
As mentioned in the introduction, I also use a second version of NEMO that is the exact
version found in the Monetary Policy Report no. 3/2011 (Norges Bank 2011), which I refer to
as Policy NEMO (PN for short). The only di¤erence between Policy NEMO and benchmark
NEMO is that a quarter of the price setters are rule of thumb price setters and three quarters
use pure indexation, which makes the model more persistent. Total intermediate goods
ination is a weighted average of the prices set by the rational and the rule of thumb pricers.
In all other aspects the two models are identical. The benchmark model is the estimated
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version of NEMO, whereas the version used for policy analyses in Norges Bank13 includes
the extra price sluggishness in order to t data in more satisfying manner.
Since policy makers in Norges Bank obviously has some belief in both of these NEMO
versions, I include Policy NEMO for robustness checks, but leave out results from the opti-
mization of rules in this model.
3.2 Credit NEMO
Credit NEMO (CN for short) is another extension of the benchmark NEMO, with a credit
market explicitly modelled as a separate sector producing houses (Brubakk and Natvik 2010).
It builds on the models by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and
Neri (2008) in which credit markets are included in otherwise standard DSGE models in
order to incorporate e¤ects from asset prices and credit constraints to the real economy. The
housing sector in CN is endogenous, in contrast to a xed real estate amount in Iacoviello
(2005), such that housing investments and production becomes an extra driving force of
business cycles. In addition to the shocks in NEMO there are three housing shocks (housing
demand, housing productivity and loan-to-value ratio) that contribute noticeably to the
variability in CN.
The housing sector in CN uses the nal good as input, and has a lower productivity
growth than the rest of the economy, which is consistent with the observed upwards trend
in the relative price of housing. All variables are detrended with their respective long run
growth rates. The housing stock depreciates over time and is increased by new investments.
House prices evolve according to the productivities in the housing and intermediate goods
sector, to the level of and change in the investments to housing stock ratio, and a housing
investment shock.
Households exhibit habits in housing consumption and the housing services enter directly
into their utility function. They are divided into two groups, patient and impatient, where
the latter are credit constrained and by assumption only borrow a given share of the value of
their housing stock (Iacoviello 2005). This loan-to-value ratio is exogenously given and set
to 0.9.14 Impatient households earn labour income and borrow from the patient households.
Only patient households have access to a foreign bonds market where they can borrow to
nance consumption, housing services and lending to impatient households. Borrowing is
13The model Norges Bank uses is constantly under revision, with adjustments and further improvements
done whenever new information arrive or additional knowledge about the functioning of the economy is
acquired. NEMO therefore changes slightly from Report to Report.
14Until recently Norwegian house buyers had to self-nance minimum 10 percent of the price, such that
a 90 percent loan-to-value ratio seems reasonable. It has however been increased to 15 percent in order to
dampen the fast increase in Norwegian housing prices.
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in zero net supply, and the total stock of housing is divided between impatient and patient
households, with shares equal to the income shares.
The intermediate sector is modelled as in the standard NEMO, but with two types of
labour, patient and impatient workers, and total labour input is a Cobb-Douglas function
of the hours worked by the two types. Intermediate rms choose prices and factor inputs in
order to maximize expected cash ow, and households choose consumption, housing services,
wages and borrowing in order to maximize expected utility given the budget constraint, and
the collateral constraint for impatient households.
By relaxing the assumption of homogeneity among households and incorporating a chan-
nel from balance sheet positions to agentsdecisions, CN is able to capture a nancial acceler-
ator e¤ect in which shocks that inuence house prices are amplied and propagated through
the e¤ects on consumption and housing demand. Two mechanisms lead to this nancial ac-
celerator, one wealth e¤ect through higher consumption when asset prices increases, and one
indirect balance sheet e¤ect. The latter is a result of higher value of the accessible credit of
impatient households, which drives up their demand for housing services and consumption.
The two e¤ects are further reinforced, creating the nancial accelerator.
3.3 LGM
3.3.1 Description of the model
The Leitemo-Gali-Monacelli (LGM) model is an open economy small-scale New Keynesian
DSGE model stemming from the work of Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Monacelli (2006).
Our version is closer to the one developed and estimated by Leitemo (2006). It shares many
features with the canonical New Keynesian model for open economies (Galí and Monacelli
2005; Galí 2008), but it includes more realistic open economy aspects by allowing for incom-
plete pass-through of exchange rate movements to import prices. This creates a source of
frictions in addition to the standard ones in the canonical model, and it is more consistent
with data (Monacelli 2006, p. 1048). In addition, the model allows both expected future
ination and previous periodsination to determine ination and output today.
The core of the model consists of four equations: two Phillips curves for domestic and im-
ported ination, respectively, an IS curve governing output gap movements, and an equation
for the real exchange rate. The domestic economy is populated by a representative agent who
chooses consumption, savings and labour supply in order to maximize discounted utility given
the budget constraint. There are complete international markets for state contingent assets,
such that consumers in all countries can invest in the same assets. This assumption pins
down the relationship between domestic consumption, foreign consumption and the terms of
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trade. The household consumes aggregates of two types of goods: domestic and imported.
The domestic good is in turn an aggregate of a continuum of goods, each produced by a
monopolistic rm that wants to set the price as a markup over marginal costs in order to
maximize discounted prots. However, prices are set in the Calvo (1983) manner. This leads
to some price stickiness, as rms are not able to translate marginal cost changes into price
changes without a delay.
While in NEMO foreign exporters set prices for their products in Norwegian currency
(local currency pricing), imported intermediary goods in LGM are priced by a separate,
domestic import sector that takes prices on the world market as given and then set the
domestic currency price in a similar way to domestic producers. These rms need to take
into account that when prices are sluggish, exchange rate movements lead to deviations of the
world price (in domestic currency units) from local market prices. This di¤erence is called
the law of one price (LOP) gap, given by
 Ft = et + p

t   pFt = et + pt   pt   (1  )

pFt   pHt

(5a)
= qt   (1  )st;
where et is the nominal exchange rate, pt is the world price in foreign currency, p
F
t is the
imported goods price (in domestic currency), pHt is the price of the domestically produced
good, qt is the real exchange rate,  is the share of imported ination in CPI ination, and
st = p
F
t  pHt is the terms of trade. When  Ft is large, ination rises as importers seek to raise
local prices in order to get them in line with the price they face in the world market. Due to
price-setting frictions, the LOP gap will not be closed instantly, and this leads to incomplete
short run pass-through.
In order to make the model more realistic, we do some changes to the core structure
outlined above. First, we follow Leitemo (2006) in allowing for a more gradual adjustment of
prices and output. This can be explained by information and implementation lags due to e.g.
rule of thumb pricing and habit formation in consumption. We allow for four lags of ination
in the two Phillips curves, and two lags of the output gap in the dynamic IS equation.
Second, we depart from Leitemos specication by allowing for a more gradual develop-
ment of the real exchange rate than what is given by a standard uncovered interest rate
parity (UIP) condition. Instead of being a pure forward-looking variable, the real exchange
rate depends partly on the expectations of next quarters rate and partly on the previous
quarters rate. It follows the equation
qt = (1  )Etqt+1 + qt 1   (rq;t   Etq;t+1) + (rq;t   Etq;t+1) +  t; (5b)
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where rq;t is the foreign nominal interest rate,  t is a shock, and all variables are in quarterly
terms.
Third, the forward component of the Phillips curves consists of expectations of only next
periods ination rate, not the whole year ahead. This is in line with both Monacellis
(Monacelli 2006) specication and the canonical representation from the literature (e.g. Galí
2008). However, the decisions are subject to a one quarter implementation lag, meaning that
the previous quarters expectations of future variables determine this quarters variables.
We calibrate the share of imported ination in CPI ination to  = 0:4, which is higher
than the values used by Leitemo (2006). There are two reasons for this change. First,
the Norwegian economy is more open than the British, which means that imported goods
constitute a larger fraction of total consumption and production. Second, the value 0:4
corresponds roughly to the share of imported intermediate goods in production of the nal
good in NEMO15.
Foreign variables  the interest rate, ination and the output gap  are modelled as
in NEMO, using estimated AR(1) processes for each variable. Since we want the foreign
economy to be identical across models, we keep the parameter values for the persistence
coe¢ cients from NEMO, but estimate the variance of the white noise shocks. For estimation
purposes (but not for later simulations), we close the model by specifying a simple interest
rate rule that includes current ination, the current output gap, and one lag of the interest
rate.
3.3.2 Estimation
The model is estimated as a system using Bayesian methods. This allows us to incorporate
prior information regarding the parameter values and in this way avoid the "absurd" values
that can result from maximum likelihood estimation when the model is mis-specied (An
and Schorfheide 2007). By weighting the likelihood function by a prior density, information
that is not contained in the sample used for estimation can be included in the estimation
process.
The Bayesian framework means that we must specify prior probability distributions that
reect our beliefs about the parameters to be estimated. As prior mean values we use the
estimates that Leitemo (2005) obtains with data from the United Kingdom. We specify
normal distributions for most parameters, but use the beta distribution for those constrained
to lie between zero and one. We estimate eight Gaussian shocks (error terms) and use the
inverse gamma distribution, which restricts them to be positive, as prior.
15Furthermore, our calibration corresponds to that which Monacelli (2006) nds to be reasonable for a
small open economy.
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The monetary policy rule is a three-parameter rule that includes ination, the output gap
and the lagged interest rate. It has the form
rt = rt 1 + t + yyt: (5c)
The prior means in this equation are based on the standard Taylor rule, but we include
a considerable degree of interest rate smoothing ( = 0:75). As priors for the standard
deviations of shocks in the AR(1) processes for foreign variables, we use the beta distribution
with means equal to the values used in NEMO. The parameters on the lags of ination in
the equations for imported and domestic ination are restricted to sum to one, i.e.
4X
j=1
j =
4X
j=1
j = 1:
We use eight data series for the period 1993 : Q4 2011 : Q2, which is the period used for
estimating the benchmark version of NEMO. All data is observed at a quarterly frequency
and have been obtained from Norges Banks Datawarehouse. The eight data series used for
estimation are reported in Appendix A.2.3, Table 10. These are for the most part the same
as those used for estimation of NEMO. We transform the observable variables in a way that is
consistent with the facts that the model variables are log-linearized around the steady state,
and that there is no long-run growth in the model. To create the output gap from the series
for GDP per capita, we use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter with a smoothing parameter
 = 16000. This is ten times the value originally proposed and most commonly used for US
quarterly data (Hodrick and Prescott 1997). The reason for choosing this value is that it
creates a smoother trend and thus more volatile cycles, thought to t the Norwegian economy
better. We also use this ltering for the real exchange rate, as we nd a clear downward trend
in this variable throughout the data period. Such detrending makes the observable variables
consistent with the model. In addition, all variables are demeaned prior to estimation.
The model is estimated in Dynare. First we obtain an approximation of the mode of
the posterior distribution. Then we construct a Gaussian approximation of this distribution
around the mode using a Metropolis-Hastings Markov Chain Monte Carlo optimization rou-
tine. The routine makes 500:000 draws from the distributions - half of which are discarded
- and runs two parallel chains. We use the mean of these distributions as point estimates of
the parameters. Priors and results of the estimation are reported in Appendix A.2.3, Table
11.
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3.4 NAM
The Norwegian aggregated model (NAM) is a quarterly macroeconometric model developed
specically for the Norwegian economy by Bårdsen and Nymoen (2001), Bårdsen, Jansen, and
Nymoen (2003), and Bårdsen (2005). The version used in this thesis is the one documented
in Bårdsen and Nymoen (2009). As opposed to the other models we consider, it does not
assume that the economy is a system in general equilibrium and there are no forward-looking
rational agents modelled. Instead, di¤erent parts of the economy are modelled separately,
relying partly on theory and partly on data to identify the relevant variables in each Equation.
The model is formulated in error correction form. First, starting from a general vector
autoregression, a cointegrating relationship between variables in levels is identied as a long-
run steady state. Then the short-run dynamic structure is estimated, using the long-run
relationships as error correction terms. When the system is out of equilibrium, i.e. when the
long-run relationship between endogenous variables does not hold, this cointegrating term
will make sure that the relevant variables move back towards their long-run values. The
model can be written on the form:
yt= +
jX
i=1
 iyt i +
kX
i=1
iyt i + ut; (6)
where yt is a vector of (logged) endogenous variables,  is a vector of constants,  i and i
are parameter matrices 8i, and ut is a vector of error terms. Here the second term on the
right hand side is the error correction term, which in each equation describes a cointegrating
relationship between the left hand side variable and a linear combination of other variables.
The short run dynamics is described by lags of di¤erenced variables.
The model consists of equations for the wage, prices, productivity, output, unemployment,
household credit, money market interest rates, and the nominal exchange rate. Wages are
modelled in a Nash bargaining framework meant to capture the high degree of coordination in
Norwegian wage setting. In the long run nominal wages will move one-for-one with the general
price level and productivity, and it will also depend to some extent on the unemployment
rate. Domestic prices are set by rms engaged in monopolistic competition. Thus the general
price level will in the long run depend on wages relative to productivity, as well as imported
prices. Long run equilibrium unemployment is determined by the growth of the real wage, as
well as the real interest rate and output. The long run behavior of the nominal exchange rate
is derived assuming that expected depreciation depends on deviations of the exchange rate
from its long-run value, and that there is a constant long run risk premium in the foreign
exchange market. Movements in relative real interest rates do not lead to one-for-one changes
in the real exchange rate.
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Total production is in the long run determined to a large extent by government demand,
which in the original system is exogenous and will be assumed constant in our model (see
below). In addition, depreciations of the real exchange rate and decreases in the real interest
rate both a¤ect output positively in the long run. In the short run, output growth is sig-
nicantly a¤ected by its own lag, changes to government expenditures and changes in real
credit. The latter e¤ect may be due to frictions in the credit market. The growth of real
credit is in turn determined in the long run by the growth of output and - to a smaller extent
- by interest rate di¤erentials. Since output a¤ects credit and vice versa, there is a simple
nancial accelerator mechanism at work. Labour productivity depends in the long run both
on real wages, the unemployment rate and a linear trend. In the short run it is a¤ected by
the change in real wages.
Most of NAM is estimated equation-by-equation using OLS, but the wage and price
block is estimated as a system with full information maximum likelihood. Identication of
the system is achieved by means of theoretical and ad hoc overidentifying restrictions on the
short run dynamics. Seasonal dummies are added for better t. The original models long-
run growth is driven by neutral technological progress, approximated by the linear trend in
labour productivity. Simulations show that the model induces a constant (apart from seasonal
variations) growth rate of output, nominal wages and prices, and constant unemployment
rate and nominal exchange rate in steady state (Bårdsen and Nymoen 2009, p. 879-883).
In order to make numerical simulations of the model tractable by making also nominal
variables stationary, we remove all trends and constant terms so that all variables are zero
in steady state. The original model can be viewed as a log-linearization. Under this inter-
pretation, the variables in our modied model will be interpreted as deviations of the actual
(logged) variables from either a deterministic balanced growth path (for some variables, such
as the output gap and productivity) or constant steady state values (for other variables,
including the ination rate and the unemployment rate). This corresponds roughly to the
log-linearization used to make NEMO and Leitemo stationary, and we will thus interpret the
relevant variables in the same way across models.
NAM contains several exogenous variables, including the oil price and foreign variables
such as consumer prices and interest rates. This poses a problem for our simulations. Instead
of assuming dynamic processes for all these variables, we set the domestic exogenous variables
equal to zero (their steady state values) in all periods. This is clearly unrealistic, and it
means that the total variation in the endogenous variables will be smaller than what is
observed in the data. However, we do not want to change the original model dynamics in
any important ways by adding new equations, and thus this approach is the most convenient
for our purposes. As for the foreign variables, we tried to model these in the same way as
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in NEMO, but the AR(1) process for foreign ination created stability-problems in NAM,
leading to innite variance of several important variables, including the domestic ination
rate. For this reason, we let foreign ination be constant, but model the foreign interest rate
as in the other models.
Because Dynare has problems in dealing with models in which some variables have innite
variance - which is the case for the nominal prices in NAM - we use a stationarized version
when calculating optimal policy rules. In this version, growth rates of price variables and the
cointegrating relationships are dened as new variables.
4 Transmission mechanisms of monetary policy
Generally in a small open economy like the Norwegian, changes in the policy rate works
on ination through three main channels: the demand channel, the exchange rate and the
expectation channel.16 When the nominal interest rate increases, the real interest rate also
increases due to sticky prices and wages. A higher real interest rate reduces investments
done by rms through lower prots and availability of credit; it decreases householdsde-
mand through a higher relative price of current consumption to future and lower income of
households with negative net savings. This reduces production and prices set by rms due
to lower marginal costs, slowing down price growth by the demand channel.
Increased Norwegian interest rates raises the attractiveness of investments in NOK and
drives up the price, leading to an appreciation. A lower exchange rate, meaning a higher value
of NOK, increases imports and reduces exports, which lowers production and inationary
pressure in domestic rms, adding to the demand channel. Total ination is dampened by
reduced prices (in domestic currency) on imported goods, both directly through the e¤ect
of lower imported ination on consumer goods and indirectly through prices set by domestic
producers utilizing imported input factors. These two e¤ects constitute the (direct and
indirect) exchange rate channel to ination.
The expectation channel works through the e¤ects of all forward-looking variables on cur-
rent ination by changing agentsexpectations about future economic developments. When
rms expect smaller price increases because of higher real interest rates, they set lower prices
today due to adjustment costs. Firms decrease investments when future return to capital
is expected to be lower, thereby reducing wage pressure, and hence production costs and
ination. Households reduce current demand when they expect future consumption to be
lower, due to consumption smoothing, contributing to the fall in ination.
Expectations are also very important in the determination of the exchange rate, since this
16See http://www.norges-bank.no/en/price-stability/ination/e¤ect-of-interest-rate-changes/.
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is a forward-looking variable. Expectations give monetary policy a way of inuencing ination
that works with a shorter lag than the demand channel, since forward-looking variables
respond immediately to policy changes.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses (in percent) of year-on-year ination, the output gap and the quarterly
annualized nominal interest rate to a one percentage point temporary increase in the latter when
monetary policy follows the original Taylor rule. Periods along the horizontal axis are quarters.
In order to visualize the e¤ects of monetary policy on the key variables, Figure 2 displays
the impulse response functions (IRF) to a one period one percent increase in the nominal
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interest rate in period t=0 of each of the four main models when the original Taylor rule is
applied: rt = 1:5t + 0:5yt.
In all models ination decreases less than output, and is more persistent, although the
magnitude and length of the disturbance varies substantially across the models. Output
in NEMO falls immediately nearly 0.06 percent below trend and rises gradually for two
years until it reaches the steady state growth path. Ination reaches the minimum after
one year and then returns to target after three and a half years after the nominal interest
rate shock. Due to nominal rigidities, a higher nominal interest rate leads to a higher real
interest rate, reducing investments, consumption and the exchange rate. The lower demand
and investments reduces production, leading to a downward pressure on prices and nominal
wages through lower marginal costs. Real wages fall as well, further contributing to the
demand channel of monetary policy, but it is dampened by reduced utilization of capital
causing marginal costs to rise. The exchange rate channel works through the e¤ect of a
real appreciation following the higher interest rate on lower prices of imported intermediaries
and higher export prices. Both imports and exports are reduced  the former because
of reduced demand and investments despite the lower import prices causing a substitution
towards foreign inputs. Lower demand will in turn lead to lower export prices, and exports
pick up again after the initial decrease. The expectation channel is present through the e¤ects
on expected future marginal costs.
CN has relatively similar responses to a monetary policy shock as NEMO, although the
variables move in smoother way and the e¤ects are slower and last longer. The persistence of
the disturbance is due to the nancial accelerator. The additional credit channel present in
this model is due to the fact that a higher real interest rate leads to lower house prices through
lower demand and investments, reducing the collateral value of the credit constrained house-
holds and thereby dampening their demand. Lower housing prices also reduces consumption
of the patient households, further dampening GDP growth.
In NAM the variables have more high frequent variation than in the other models, but the
duration of the disturbance to the variables is roughly the same as in NEMO, albeit a more
hump-shaped and larger e¤ect. An increase in the nominal interest rate leads to an immediate
nominal and real appreciation of the NOK which a¤ects domestic prices and wages through
decreased import prices. This is the direct exchange rate channel to ination, but there is
also an indirect e¤ect in the demand channel through lower competitiveness of exporting
rms following an appreciation, and therefore lower GDP and higher unemployment. Due
to lower ination, the increase in the nominal interest rate is translated into an even bigger
increase in the real interest rate17 which a¤ects production with a lag and unemployment
17The real interest rate in NAM is dened as the di¤erence between the nominal interest rate and current
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with two lags, contributing to the demand channel. A third channel is the credit channel
working through the e¤ects of the interest rate on output due to reduced availability of real
credit. In NAM there is no expectation channel since the model is purely backward-looking.
The Leitemo-Gali-Monacelli model appears in Figure 2 to be the most persistent model,
but this is just an artifact of the policy rule used, which is not hard-hitting enough to stabilize
the economy as good as in the other three models. Due to the rule, output falls substantially
more, and moves slowly in dampened cycles back to the long run equilibrium. The monetary
policy shock immediately reduces demand and production, which lowers domestic ination
through the demand channel with a lag. The expectation channel works through expected
future ination that lowers current ination, and the complicated lag structure causes GDP
and consumer prices to move in a hump-shaped fashion. A higher nominal interest rate
decreases the exchange rate, creating a negative law-of-one-price gap, ceteris paribus. But
the reduced terms of trade reduces the gap because importing rms lowers prices on imported
goods, further reducing the output gap and ination.
5 Method
The program used for the technical part of the analysis is MatLab with the software Dynare.
Dynare solves the models using a rst order approximation around (a zero) steady state
and calculates the theoretical variances of the endogenous variables. In order to nd the
rst-best policy reaction function of a specied form, the variances of the variables entering
the objective function is minimized. The size of the shocks in the models are given by their
standard deviation, and the resulting value of the objective function, or loss, is the sum of
the unconditional variances of the included variables.
The estimated size of the standard deviations of identical shocks could be di¤erent across
models because it depends on the other shocks included in the estimation. If a model has
few shocks, each of them will play a signicant role in explaining the variability in the data,
but as the number of shocks increases, the relative importance of each shock decreases.
The standard deviations determines the size of the loss, as more variability in the exogenous
variables in the simulations naturally leads to larger uctuations in the endogenous variables.
This can indeed be seen in the results, where NEMO yields losses of a magnitude far above
the other models, and NAM quite a lot below. CN is the model with the greatest number
of shocks (17), but has the second largest loss conducting optimal monetary policy. NEMO
has 15 shocks, NAM 11, and the LGM model only 7 estimated shocks. It may seem that the
shocks included in NAM have less explanatory power than the shocks in the other models,
ination: t = it   t:
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and therefore estimated to be smaller, but as explained in Chapter 3.4 about NAM, the small
loss is partly due to the fact that we have removed some of the original exogenous variables,
in particular government spending, which is an important driver of short run uctuations
in GDP. We have, of course, also removed the interest rate shock in all models, and since
the models are estimated with di¤erent numbers of shocks, the variability explained by the
excluded shock di¤ers. Hence, the removal of it could possibly explain some of the di¤erence
in the size of losses.
Below is a presentation of the simple interest rate rules in this thesis, both rst-best rules
and Bayesian rules, and an explanation of how they are derived. Bayesian rules are relevant
for my analyses because they are found to be more robust than simple rules optimized within
a single model. The chapter ends with a discussion of the di¤erent loss function specications.
5.1 Optimal simple rules
To nd the rst-best simple interest rate rules in a model, the following loss function18
Lt = Et[(t   )2 + y(yt   y)2 + r(rt   rt 1)2]
is minimized in order to nd the coe¢ cients r, ;, y and y 1 in the following equations:
rt = 
t + 
yyt; (Rule 2)
rt = 
rrt 1 + (1  r)(t + yyt), or (Rule 3)
rt = 
rrt 1 + (1  r)(t + yyt + y 1yt 1). (Rule 4)
Here t is the current year-on-year ination rate and yt is the output gap. The resulting
value of the loss function is what I refer to as "osr loss" (optimal simple rule loss), denoted
by Losr, and the rules as the two-, three- and four-parameter interest rate rules, respectively.
Rule 2 is of the same form as the classical Taylor rule, capturing the important aspect of
central bankstendency to "lean against the wind", but not allowing for responses to further
information. Rule 3 incorporates gradualism in the adjustments of the policy rate, as this
is found in data and therefore appears to better represent actual monetary policy than Rule
2, as in Levin et al. (1999). Following Taylor and Wieland (2009), I include Rule 4, where
more lagged information is used for monetary policy decisions. I also consider two variations
18The loss function is the same as for optimal monetary policy, but is minimized subject to the simple
policy rule. In optimal policy the unconditional variances are minimized by reacting in a highly complex
manner with the interest rate to economic disturbances, whereas it is restricted to respond only to a limited
set of variables in the above optimization.
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of Rule 3: One where the lagged interest rate has been replaced by the lagged output gap,
and one where it has been replaced by lagged ination.
The values  and y represent the long-run response of the nominal interest rate to
deviations in ination and output from trend or target, i.e. when the smoothing of the
interest rate is completed, and are thus the "true" responses. They are the values I report
in the tables, if nothing else is stated. The short run coe¢ cients are attained by multiplying
the bracket in front of the long run rule with the coe¢ cients in this rule, and indicate how
much the central bank reacts in the same period as deviations is observed.
The rationale for not including forward-looking variables, only contemporaneous and
lagged variables in the interest rate rules, is that the former are highly model dependent and
should not be used in robustness analyses. Basing the policy decision in a model on a future
variable naturally implies the use of a forecast within the model, and transferring a rule with
a model-specic forecast to another model in order to analyze the rules performance would
not be fully valid since the variable that the rule responds to would be di¤erent across the
models. Also, a forward-looking rule may be less robust due to the fact that it uses more
model-specic information (Brubakk and Natvik 2010).
Contemporaneous values of ination and output gap are, of course, di¢ cult to observe
(in particular the latter which may not be revealed until many years later when the trend
has been properly estimated) and must be estimated. If the models are used to nd the
values, the same argument as for future variables would hold true. But in Norges Bank they
use SAM (System of Aggregated Models)19 for nowcasts, so real time observations are done
outside the model, and can hence be utilized in an instrument rule.
5.2 Bayesian rules
The optimal Bayesian interest rate rules is found by combining the three competing mod-
els20 Credit NEMO, the Leitemo-Gali-Monacelli model and NAM into one model script, and
minimizing a weighted sum of the losses generated in them when using the rule found to be
optimal for the "model average":
19SAM has since 2008 been used to produce contemporaneous and short run CPI and GDP forecasts,
and has signicantly improved forecasting in Norges Bank (Jore 2012). It consists of 167 di¤erent models,
including NEMO and a slightly di¤erent version of NAM as the only two structural models. But their
importance in the nowcasts are minor due to the large number of models, so the use of current variables is
still valid.
20NEMO is not included because it would lead to a "false" picture of the performance of the Bayesian rules
in this model, as the rule would do articially well by construction. The evalutation of a rule based on only
the three altrenative models is more clear-cut for robustness purposes.
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LBayesian;abst = NAMLNAMt + LGMLLGMt + CNLCNt : (Bayesian "absolute loss" function)
Here NAM , LGM and CN are the probabilities assigned by the monetary authority to each
of the models, and LNAMt , LLGMt and LCNt the resulting loss from applying the optimized
Bayesian rule in the seperate models.
The form of the Bayesian loss function is clearly a subject for discussion. First of all, it
is not obvious that the sum of the seperate loss functions is the proper form, it could just
as well be a quadratic or some other function. Apart from that, the relative weights depend
on both the subjective beliefs about the probability of the di¤erent models and on how the
losses of these models are scaled. The losses of each model could either enter with their
absolute size (in level) or be normalized in some way in order to have a common reference
for the performance of the policy rule in the optimization, since they are of such di¤erent
magnitude, as already discussed. Because NAM yields signicantly smaller losses than the
two other models for all policies, using absolute losses could be viewed as "unfair" to this
model, which is seen from the optimized rules in Chapter 6.2. It is natural to question
whether the losses are the "true" ones when we have removed some variability in the models
and changed a few of the exogenous processes. They may not have the same interpretation
and are thus inappropriate as arguments in the objective function, LBayesian;abst . But on
the other hand, the losses are supposed to be expressions of the actual harm caused by
macroeconomic uctuations, and it could thus be argued that they correctly represent the
preferences of the central bank.
Another approach is to weight the Bayesian objective with the loss in the seperate models
generated by the modelsrst-best simple rules of the same form as the Bayesian rule to be
found, LModel;osr; to reect how well the Bayesian rules do relative to the modelsown rules.
NAM now receives relatively more importance in the optimization, and the Bayesian rule
using this osr-loss-weighted objective is more similar to the rules from NAM than with the
absolute size of the losses.21
LBayesian;osrt = NAM
LNAMt
LNAM;osr + 
LGM LLGMt
LLGM;osr + 
CN LCNt
LCN;osr : (Bayesian osr loss)
I have looked at four di¤erent combinations of relative weighting of the models: First
21A third alternative would be to scale the Bayesian objective with the individual Ramsey losses, reecting
concerns about the damage of using a Bayesian rule instead of conducting optimal monetary policy in each
model. As will be seen, the di¤erence between Ramsey losses and osr losses are roughly of the same magnitude
across the models. Using osr losses appears to be more intuitive since I am looking at the use of simple interest
rate rules, and I therefore present results with the osr losses only.
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NAM = LGM = CN = 1=3 and then 1/6 for two of the models and 2/3 for the last,
for each of the three possible combinations. Optimized coe¢ cients are reported in the next
chapter.
This type of rule is commonly referred to as a "Bayesian rule" in the literature, although
the term is somewhat misleading as it rather is a "model averaging" rule than "Bayesian"
in the original meaning. The weights assigned to each model are xed "priors" and are
not updated using Bayesrule when policy makers acquire additional knowledge about the
probability distribution of the models. Assuming that beliefs are never updated is highly
debatable. It is natural to believe that new information about the structure of the economy
will a¤ect the priors, and the rules should in consequence be changed.22 Nevertheless, the
Bayesian rules can be interpreted as an upper bound of the insurance possibilities, when
the central bank commits to the prescribed policy and never updates the relevance of the
competing models.
5.3 Di¤erent loss functions
The variables entering the loss function are the unconditional variances of yearly ination,
output deviations relative to trend and the change in the nominal interest rate. As the
models are quarterly, the prescribed interest rate rules are also in quarterly terms and had
to be converted into yearly terms, either year-on-year or annualized. Year-on-year ination
is less noisy and appears to be a better variable for policy making than quarterly annualized
ination which includes a lot of short run uctuations that are impossible and undesirable to
mitigate23. The optimal coe¢ cients in the simple interest rate rules increase when quarterly
ination is used, since the central bank then needs to react more aggressively. The goal of
monetary policy is after all to ensure macroeconomic stabilization, so responding to large
shocks that moves the economy substantially away from the trend, and not to short run
uctuations, seems natural. I therefore choose year-on-year ination in the objective functions
and simple interest rate rules, in line with the existing literature (e.g. Taylor and Wieland
2009, Taylor 1993, Levin et al. 1999).
I consider three variations of the loss function in Equation 2, which I refer to as L1, L2
and L3. The rst is the benchmark loss function that I present throughout the thesis. The
22Thanks to Lars Svensson for pointing this out to me.
23Looking at the autocorrelation coe¢ cients conrms this. All models have a high degree of persistence
in yearly ination when optimal monetary policy is conducted, around 0.8-0.9, but the correlation between
two succeeding quarters is substantially lower. In NAM the autocorrelation coe¢ cient decreases from 0.85
for yearly to neglible 0.0014 for quarterly, and in the LGM model from 0.8 to 0.3. The decreases are large
in Credit NEMO and NEMO as well, 0.11 and 0.29, respectively. Thus, quarterly ination uctuates more
randomly and is harder to stabilize than year-on-year ination in the set of models.
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two others have been used mainly for cross-checking, and the results from them are placed
in the appendix.
Relative weights L1 L2 L3
 1 1 1
y 0.5 1.5 0.5
r 0.25 0.25 0.1
Table 1: The three di¤erent loss function specications considered.
The weight on ination is normalized to unity in all three loss functions, such that the
other weights are relative to inationary concerns. Policy makerspreferences are of course
hard to model, and the weights assigned to the di¤erent arguments in the loss function may
seem a bit ad hoc. As already argued, assigning ination, GDP and interest stabilization
some weight is preferred by an ination targeting central bank. I therefore do not consider
the case of a pure "ination nutter".
The benchmark, L1; uses the weights fromNorges Banks Monetary Policy Report No.3/2011
(Norges Bank 2011) with half of the concern for uctuations in output and a quarter for
nominal interest rate movements relative to the preferences for a stable ination rate. This
corresponds to the preferences of a relatively exible ination targeting central bank.
In the second loss function, L2; the relative concern for closing the output gap is higher
than for reaching the ination target  it has been increased from 0.5 to 1.5, with the other
weights as in L1. If the central bank doubts the close connection between ination and
output stabilization, and since the output gap represents the real economy that it actually
cares about, it could attach a higher weight on the latter.
In the rst Monetary Policy Report of 2012, No. 1/2012 (Norges Bank 2012), the weights
in the loss function are changed in the direction of L2 from No. 3/2011. Output stabilization
concerns are increased to 0.75 with the motivation that it better ensures nancial stability.
It is argued that since nancial imbalances often build up in periods with high capacity
utilization, i.e. when there is a large deviation in production from the trend, increasing the
weight of the output gap can reduce the risk of such imbalances. I have cross-checked some
results with this loss function, but kept L2 as the main function since it is a more extreme
version and thus better serves the intended robustness purposes.
The third loss function, L3; barely contains any concern for partial adjustments of the
interest rate per se, but since the central bank prefers a balanced evolution of all endogenous
variables, changing the policy rate gradually may be reasonable anyhow. If the economy
returns faster and stays closer to the steady state for large adjustments in the nominal interest
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rate, the central bank will adjust the policy instrument accordingly, since its variability is
paid little attention to.
At the outset of the analysis, I tried with another version of L3 where r was set to zero,
which I refer to as "the modied L3". The optimized rules derived from this loss function
were so extreme that the robustness check felt useless and the consequent policy implications
were unrealistic. These are similar results to those of Svensson (2000) referred to in Chapter
2.4. The only model that gave "reasonable" rules was NAM, where interest rate smoothing
is hardly an issue due to the backward-looking nature of the model.
In the LGM model it was not possible to nd optimal coe¢ cients with the modied L3;
as they reached the bounds of the searching area no matter how large I made it. In particular
the output gap coe¢ cient was large, even larger than the one on ination. This indicates
that the only reason to pursue gradualism in the policy rate adjustments in this model is
that the central bank has explicit preferences for such behaviour. Complete stabilization is
possible if the nominal interest rate is allowed to react su¢ ciently to shocks, but it is hard to
imagine that any central bank would apply such aggressive rules. Most importantly, for rules
of this magnitude the log linearization of the models no longer holds as an approximation.
Consequently, I added a small weight on interest rate smoothing in the third loss function.
6 Results
In this chapter I present the optimal simple rules resulting from the optimization of each
individual loss function and the Bayesian objectives. There are several forms of the Bayesian
rules, and in order to simplify the reading of the results, they are given "code names" in
Table 2. I also repeat the specications of the three rules afterwards.
Absolute loss Osr loss
Relative weights Rule 2 Rule 3 Rule 4 Rule 2 Rule 3 Rule 4
NAM = LGM = CN = 1=3 B2abs B3abs B4abs B2osr B3osr B4osr
NAM = LGM = 1=6; CN = 4=6 B2aC B3aC B4aC B2oC B3oC B4oC
NAM = CN = 1=6; LGM = 4=6 B2aL B3aL B4aL B2oL B3oL B4oL
LGM = CN = 1=6; NAM = 4=6 B2aN B3aN B4aN B2oN B3oN B4oN
Table 2: Bayesian rules. "Absolute loss" refers to a rule where the level of losses in each model is
minimized, whereas with "osr loss" the losses enter relative to what the rst-best rule of the same
specication as the Bayesian rule generates in the seperate models. The last capital letter indicates
which model is attached the highest probability in the Bayesian objective function. No capital letter
means equal relative weights.
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rt = 
t + 
yyt (Rule 2)
rt = 
rrt 1 + (1  r)(t + yyt) (Rule 3)
rt = 
rrt 1 + (1  r)(t + yyt + y 1yt 1) (Rule 4)
6.1 Optimal simple rules
Table 3 shows the rst-best simple interest rate rules from each model with the benchmark
loss function, L1. As can be seen from the table, the optimal coe¢ cients vary to a large
extent across the models, but in all rules except those of NAM and the output gap coe¢ cient
of Rule 2 in NEMO, the values are signicantly larger than in the rule proposed by Taylor
(1993). This holds true for the other loss functions considered as well (see Appendix B.1,
Table 12, 13 and 14). Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) consider optimal interest rate rules of
the same form as in Table 3 in a small model for the U.S. economy, and report coe¢ cients
of roughly the same size, albeit somewhat smaller interest rate smoothing parameters. In
particular they nd values substantially above the original Taylor rule (above 2 on ination
and above 1 on output) in ve di¤erent loss function specications. Other authors have also
argued that the coe¢ cients in the Taylor rule should be higher than 1.5 and 0.5, e.g. Ball
(1997).
NEMO NAM LGM CN
Rule 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4
r 0.80 0.81 0.34 0.08 0.80 0.80 0.96 0.97
 1.88 3.87 3.96 1.12 1.16 1.14 2.19 4.46 4.42 3.08 22.17 29.90
y 0.19 1.14 1.32 0.35 0.55 0.36 1.76 5.08 4.93 0.57 8.36 17.87
y 1 -0.14 0.36 0.11 -6.94
L 23.26 22.40 22.40 2.53 2.40 2.15 4.55 3.53 3.53 6.14 5.57 5.56
%L 12.1 8.0 8.0 33.0 25.7 12.6 46.9 13.9 13.9 23.2 11.9 11.5
Table 3: Optimal simple interest rate rules of each model, and the generated loss. At the bottom
row is the percentage increase in loss relative to Ramsey loss.
As can be seen from Table 3, NEMO and the Leitemo-Gali-Monacelli model prefer quite
similar reaction patterns for the nominal interest rate, except from the response to out-
put uctuations, to which LGM demands signicantly stronger responses than NEMO. The
output coe¢ cient is in fact even larger than the ination coe¢ cient.
First-best policy rules from NAM and CN are quite the opposite of each other, with
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NAM dictating only slight responses to deviations of output and ination from target. The
rules barely fulll the Taylor principle, and there is hardly any smoothing of the interest rate
path. Strong reactions to shocks are not necessary in NAM since they die out relatively fast
regardless of policy, due to the equilibrium correction mechanisms. Because expectations
do not enter in the model, the output gap is a function of historic interest rates only, and
monetary policy e¤ects the real economy sluggishly. In order to have a contemporaneous
e¤ect, it is optimal to respond to lagged output movements (or even better to changes in the
output gap because the model is in di¤erence form), which can be seen from the negative
coe¢ cient on lagged production in Equation 65 in Appendix A.3.2. This negative relation
creates dampened oscillations back to the long run equilibrium.
Conducting optimal policy in NAM shows that output is little persistent and that the
second order autocorrelation coe¢ cient is markedly larger than the rst order coe¢ cient,
indicating the gain from reacting to last periods movements. The third and fourth order
autocorrelation coe¢ cients are indeed negative, so striving to dampen current uctuations
might only enlarge the oscillations. Interest rate smoothing therefore gains nothing, and may
in worst case lead to instability, as historic interest rates are poor indicators for the optimal
rate today.
The optimal coe¢ cient on the lagged interest rate is almost negligible in the four-parameter
rule, but increases substantially when the lagged output gap is removed from the rule, indi-
cating that the latter variable is successful in achieving su¢ cient stabilization. Without the
possibility to react to yt 1, policy uses the lagged interest rate as a substitute for the missing
historic information.
The optimized coe¢ cients in the three and four-parameter rules of CN are surprisingly
large, but due to the high degree of interest rate smoothing, the actual short run reactions
are of similar magnitudes as in the other models: The net coe¢ cients attained by multi-
plying the ination and output gap coe¢ cients in Table 3 with (1   r) vary to a smaller
extent across models than the long run coe¢ cients. The parameters in CNs rules can be
interpreted as a "threat" by the central bank su¢ cient to stabilize growth in consumer prices
and GDP through the e¤ect on agentsexpectations about the future interest rate path, and
hence about price and production developments. The highly inertial policy ensures that the
economy reverts back to steady state before these long run responses actually occur. This
holds true even for a loss function with no concern for gradualism in policy (the modied
L3): The optimal interest rate smoothing parameter is 0.75 and 0.84 for Rule 3 and Rule
4, respectively, and the other coe¢ cients are of roughly equal magnitude as with L1. When
interest rate smoothing is removed from the rule, the two-parameter rule is similar to those
in the other models, although still quite aggressive.
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In the last row of Table 3, the performance of the rst-best rules relative to optimal policy
is displayed, i.e. the relative increase in the loss generated by the simple rule, LSR, to the
minimum loss, L:
%L=L
SR L
L :
Following the simple guidelines for monetary policy is not as harmful as one would have
thought, considering the limited information utilized. Most of the rules perform quite well,
at least the two larger forms of rules. Rule 4 yields less than 14 percent higher loss than
optimal policy in the LGM model, which is the worst among the four models.24 Rule 3
is less successful, in particular in NAM, as expected. 14 percent higher loss is, of course,
a signicant number, yet still a reasonable price to pay for the huge robustness gain from
simple policy rules.
It is a common result in the literature that simple instrument rules of the form in Table 3
do not substantially deteriorate the performance of monetary policy relative to optimal policy.
Levin et al. (1999) uses four di¤erent structural models for the U.S. economy and nd that
rules where the rst di¤erence of the nominal interest rate reacts to the current output gap
and the one-year average ination deviations from target, i.e. a three-parameter rule with the
interest rate smoothing restricted to unity, are more robust to model uncertainty than both
smaller and larger rules. Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) concludes that simple instrument
rules tend to perform quite well in the small empirical U.S. economy model considered, even
the Taylor type of rules (i.e. Rule 2).
Looking at the size of the losses25 generated by using the rst-best simple instrument rules
in the four models in Table 3, it becomes clear that the gain from including more information
beyond the lagged interest rate is in most cases negligible. To highlight the magnitude of the
di¤erences, the relative increase in loss following the removal of one variable at a time from
the policy reaction function is displayed in Table 4 for the three di¤erent loss functions. For
all models except NAM, and all loss functions, the increase in loss never exceeds one percent
changing from a four to a three-parameter rule, indicating that setting the policy rate on
the basis of the contemporaneous ination and output deviations in addition to allowing
for a certain degree of gradualism, is su¢ cient. Because Rule 4 uses more model-specic
information it runs the risk of being less robust, and it is also less comprehensive due to the
more complicated reaction pattern of the central bank.
24For L2 the highest numbers with Rule 4 are 16:7 per cent in NAM and 14:8 per cent in Credit NEMO.
For the other models and the rules in L3 the increases are smaller.
25The numbers have been multiplied by 10000 in order to simplify the exposition. This corresponds to
multiplying all standard deviations by 100 in order to get them in percentage terms.
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L1 L2 L3
Model 4 to 3 3 to 2 4 to 3 3 to 2 4 to 3 3 to 2
NEMO 0:003 3:8 0:45 5:51 0:0001 1:54
NAM 11:68 5:8 17:1 6:5 13:58 5:01
LGM 0:003 29:0 0:02 25:65 0:09 19:98
CN 0:30 10:2 0:95 12:40 0:77 7:35
Table 4: Percentage increase in loss from reducing the number of parameters of the optimal simple
rules in each model for the three di¤erent loss function specications.
Removing the lagged interest rate as well from a simple interest rate rule appears to
cause more harm. The biggest increase in loss is in the LGM model of nearly 30 percent,
but NAM experiences smaller increases compared to the removal of the lagged output gap.
Naturally, the deterioration decreases as interest rate smoothing is attached less weight in
the loss function, as seen from Table 4. But even with a very small weight, as in L3, it
is substantially better to adjust the interest rate gradually. In NAM this follows from the
information contained in the lagged interest rate, and in the other three models it is because
of the history dependence of policy.
Another point that should be highlighted are the generally small increases in NEMO
compared to the other models. It seems that NEMO is relatively insensitive to the design of
the monetary policy reaction function.
The small average gain from extending Rule 3 with the lagged output gap is remarkable
in Table 4. Yet, including the fourth variable should be considered if the central banks belief
in NAM is su¢ ciently strong. The lagged output gap drives the performance of the simple
instrument rules in NAM, which becomes even clearer from the evaluation of two alternative
specications of Rule 3 (results in Appendix B.2, Table 17):
rt = 
t + 
yyt + 
y 1yt 1; (Rule 3b)
rt = 
t + 
 1t 1 + 
yyt: (Rule 3c)
Not surprisingly, removing the lagged interest rate from the four-parameter rule as in
Rule 3b, increases the loss marginally in NAM , as the degree of interest rate smoothing
is minimal and hence contributes little to the rules performance. But the corresponding
optimized rule for each of the other models performs a lot worse than both Rule 3 and Rule
4, and only slightly better than Rule 2.
Rule 3c does not seem to be superior to any rule, except from a small improvement in
NEMO compared to Rule 3b. Allowing for a reaction to the lagged ination is consequently
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not worth considering if the central bank believes in the set of models used in this thesis, but
rather to the historic output gap if NAM is attached a high probability.
For optimal simple instrument rules within each seperate model, it appears that three-
parameter rules are quite good. But as will be seen in Chapter 7.1, they do poorly in
other models and are hence little robust. Instead Bayesian rules should be considered for
robustness purposes, because they accommodate the conict between the preferred policies
in the models.
6.2 Bayesian rules
Below are interest rate rules prescribed by averaging over the outcomes of the three reference
models, NAM, the LGM model and CN. Table 5 display the two, three and four-parameter
optimized Bayesian rules with equal relative weights attached to the models, both for absolute
and relative losses in the objective function. Again, the di¤erences in loss between four-
and three-parameter rules are relatively small (albeit somewhat larger than the di¤erence
between two and three for the "osr loss"-rules due to NAM), and the smaller rule appears to
be su¢ cient for robustness purposes.
Coe¢ cients B2abs B3abs B4abs B2osr B3osr B4osr
r 0.66 0.53 0.63 0.40
 2.16 3.53 3.24 1.96 2.87 2.55
y 0.65 1.98 1.24 0.59 1.68 0.84
y 1 0.53 0.54
LBayesian 5.571 4.697 4.626 1.299 1.245 1.172
Table 5: Optimal Bayesian interest rate rules with equal relative weighting of the three models.
The rules are less aggressive when osr losses are used to normalize the Bayesian loss
function, since NAM then receives more importance because of its small losses that the
Bayesian objective is scaled with. As already explained, the rst-best rules from NAM are
quite mild and little inertial, whereas the LGMmodel prefers aggressive rules. The conict in
the Bayesian optimization is mostly between these two models, and the optimal coe¢ cients
seem to be "averages" of the two individual rules. NAM is relatively more important in
the optimization over the output gap coe¢ cient, because larger values of this may lead to
instability, as will be seen from the performance of the LGM-rules in NAM in Chapter 7.1.
Similar patterns with di¤erent relative weights on the three models can be seen in Table 6.
When NAM enters in the objective function with four times the probability of the two other
models, the coe¢ cients in the Bayesian rule decreases substantially, and again, particularly
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the coe¢ cient on the lagged interest rate. The rules tailored more to CN and the LGMmodel
are similar to each other, although the CN-rules in the rst three columns have somewhat
larger coe¢ cients, except for the output gap coe¢ cient.
Coe¢ cients B2oC B3oC B4oC B2oL B3oL B4oL B2oN B3oN B4oN
r 0.65 0.50 0.73 0.59 0.52 0.24
 2.28 3.75 3.32 2.01 3.49 2.99 1.65 1.98 1.89
y 0.59 1.78 1.04 0.74 2.82 1.57 0.48 1.04 0.52
y 1 0.43 0.65 0.45
LBayesian 1,185 1,192 1,168 1,326 1,176 1,049 1,244 1,210 1,157
Table 6: Di¤erent relative weights on the alternative models, using relative losses in the Bayesian
loss function.
The Bayesian loss generated by B3oC is actually larger than B2oC, which is a consequence
of the conict between the preferred policy preferences in NAM and CN when the nominal
interest rate responds to three variables.
NAM is the model driving most of the results. Without this model, i.e. averaging over the
two other reference models only, the rules become more aggressive (see Appendix B.2, Table
16). Not surprisingly, they perform signicantly better in all models but NAM, in which the
loss is tripled relative to the rst-best four-parameter rule. Switching to the three-parameter
rule generated by LGM and CN, the improvement becomes substantial, however  the loss
in NAM is "only" doubled. This result may appear surprising since the outcome in NAM
is found to be better with Rule 4 than Rule 3. The superiority of the larger rule hinges
crucially on a positive reaction to the lagged output gap. CN, on the other hand, strongly
prefers the opposite, such that the optimized rule for the average of CN and LGM adopts
this characteristic, and hence the performance in NAM is poor.
7 Robustness
Simple monetary policy rules are designed to take account of only the most
basic principle of monetary policy of leaning against the wind of ination and
output movements. Because they are not ne tuned to specic assumptions, they
are more robust to mistaken assumptions.(Taylor and Wieland 2009)
Next the robustness properties of some of the interest rate rules considered in this thesis
is presented. I use two di¤erent tools for checking how well the rules perform in the set
of models, implied ination variability premium (IIP) and fault tolerance. Below I describe
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both measures and how to derive them. In the Discussion section the results are related to
the existing literature on robust monetary policy rules.
I start out by analyzing IIP in order to eliminate those rules that generate particularly
high ination variability in the models. These rules are not robust and not worth considering
further. I then analyze the fault tolerance properties of the remaining rules. It is desirable to
have a rule that is both robust in the sense of generating little uctuations in consumer prices
across models, and robust to changes in the parameter values. If a rule is fault tolerant, the
policy maker does not cause too much harm if he "misses" on the optimal value of a coe¢ cient.
Even though I have found that four-parameter rules do not signicantly outperform smaller
rules in the seperate models, they could still be more robust, and are therefore included in
the analyses below.
7.1 Implied Ination variability Premium
Implied Ination variability Premium (IIP) is used to evaluate the performance of a policy
rule relative to another rule, proposed by Kuester and Wieland (2010). It is dened as the
percentage point (pp) increase in the standard deviation of the ination rate for a given
increase in absolute loss, keeping output and interest rate variability constant, i.e. the dif-
ference in loss caused by the interchange of two rules, from A to B, translated into ination
variation:
IIPB = 100 [
q
LBt   yvar(yAt )  rvar(rAt )  s:d:(At )]:
For constant variance of yt and rt, the increase in loss generated by rule B relative to rule A
will be equal to the relative increase in the variance of ination, but since the variances of the
former two variables in general di¤er between the rules, the variance dispersion is converted
into variance of ination in order to make the rulesachievements comparable. IIP is then the
square root of this "altered ination variance". For example, the optimized four-parameter
rule in NEMO yields a loss of 22.40217, while the rule from NAM yields a loss in NEMO
of 45.68388, which is an increase of 104 percentage. The standard deviation of the ination
must increase by 2.67 pp in order to yield the same increase in loss in NEMO switching from
NEMOs to NAMs rst-best rule.
IIP is measured in absolute terms and is thus easily comparable across models, whereas
the relative increase in loss in a model depends on the size of this loss. Due to the large
di¤erence in losses in the models, the relative increase is a less "neutral" measure. IIP is
directly interpretable in terms of economic consequences, namely how much more consumer
prices will uctuate if the central bank uses the wrong model.
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Table 7 illustrates the dispersion of the preferred monetary policy in the ve models. The
rules from NAM generally creates the biggest increase in ination variability across models,
with an IIP in CN of 3.68 pp in the case of Rule 4 and 3.60 pp in LGM with Rule 2. This is a
big price to pay in form of increased ination uctuations if the economy turns out to be best
described by CN or the LGM model, but the central bank believes it is NAM. Even larger is
the IIP of Rule 3 from CN applied to NAM, of a striking 7.14 pp. This outlier is due to the
fact that NAM is little tolerant to inertial policy, and in particular when the possibility to
respond to the lagged output gap is absent. The three-parameter rule from CN holds both of
these properties and therefore yields a miserable outcome in NAM. The extreme parameter
values excludes it from the set of candidate rules for insurance against model uncertainty,
because no policy maker would apply such an aggressive rule.
NAM is intolerant to policies from the other models because it is self-stabilizing, so
reacting with large changes in the policy rate to movements in the key variables might do
more harm than good. The IIP to be paid if NAM is the "true" economy, and the central
bank acts as if it were another model is thus relatively high. On average it is 1.17 for Rule
4, 2.42 for Rule 3 and "innity" for Rule 2. The original Taylor rule, shown in the bottom
row of Table 7, performs the best, because it is the rule with the smallest parameter values
and therefore resembles most NAMs rst-best policy. The other models also appear to be
relatively tolerant to Taylors policy compared to the optimized rules from the other models,
particularly the LGM model.
Table 7 reveals that Rule 2 is signicantly less robust than Rule 3, but more than Rule 4
in most of the cases, due to the smaller amount of "model-tailoring". The IIP increases on
average a lot more between Rule 3 and Rule 2 than Rule 3 and Rule 4, and again, particularly
in the LGM model. Rule 2 from the latter model actually creates instability in NAM because
of the large output response, which emphasizes the conict between the preferred policies of
the two models. However, reducing the output coe¢ cient with 0.5 removes the instability it
creates in NAM, because the relation between the ination and output gap coe¢ cients then
becomes more equal to NAMs Rule 2, albeit twice the size in magnitude. A large ination
response can somehow "outweigh" the output reaction such that a rules performance in
NAM improves, which is why the four- and two-parameter rule from CN are better than
Rule 3.
Again, the conict between the modelspreferences for reaction patterns of the nominal
interest rate becomes clear. In particular, it seems to be NAM versus the other models, as
expected, due to this models highly di¤erent features.
On average across all the rules, Policy NEMO has the lowest IIP of the ve models. This
model is the most robust with respect to the design of monetary policy, closely followed
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IIP [%L]
Rule 4 NEMO NAM LGM CN PN
NEMO 0 [8.0] 1.21 [193.2] 2.16 [355.5] 0.06 [14.7] 0.41 [28.8]
NAM 2.67 [120.3] 0 [12.6] 1.34 [191.4] 3.68 [473.3] 0.80 [111.7]
LGM 1.04 [43.5] 0.88 [128.1] 0 [13.9] 1.00 [83.6] 2.46 [42.0]
CN 0.06 [9.7] 1.86 [352.5] 1.71 [259.8] 0 [11.5] 0.83 [42.8]
Rule 3
NEMO 0 [8.0] 1.21 [207.6] 2.26 [380.2] 0.06 [14.9] 0.38 [28.4]
NAM 2.07 [89.3] 0 [25.7] 1.92 [302.1] 2.50 [266.9] 0.78 [88.1]
LGM 1.03 [43.3] 0.82 [133.0] 0 [13.9] 1.00 [83.3] 1.93 [42.0]
CN 0.06 [9.8] 7.14 [3325.4]* 1.84 [287.3] 0 [11.9] 0.71 [39.6]
Rule 2
NEMO 0 [12.1] 0.66 [112.8] 2.09 [384.7] 0.15 [31.4] 0.01 [17.2]
NAM 1.80 [79.8] 0 [33.0] 3.60 [806.6] 2.24 [238.2] 0.92 [77.3]
LGM 1.21 [54.1] Instability* 0 [46.9] 1.09 [102.2] 1.69 [6.2]
CN 0.17 [74.3] 0.84 [142.8] 0.95 [165.6] 0 [23.2] 0.16 [21.5]
Taylor rule 0.66 [33.4] 0.15 [47.5] 0.92 [160.6] 0.70 [68.6] 0.51 [32.9]
Table 7: IIP: increase in the standard deviation of ination changing between each models optimized
four-parameter rules. Percentage increase in loss relative to Ramsey loss is displayed in parentheses.
by NEMO. The least robust model is LGM, having the highest average IIP, disregarding
the two "outlier" results (marked with an asterisk). LGM needs strong responses to output
uctuations, and since none of the other models entail similar properties, their rules lead to
signicantly less stability.
As expected, NEMO is tolerant to CN policy, and vice versa, because they have similar
core structure and main transmission mechanisms for monetary policy. This holds true for
PN as well, even though it is signicantly more backward-looking than the former two.
The values in parentheses in Table 7 show the percentage increases in loss relative to
conducting optimal policy, in order to highlight the di¤erence between the two measures. A
high increase in loss in a model could either be due to the fact that simple rules generally
perform poorly, or because the model is little tolerant to rules from other models. A high
IIP can also be caused by two di¤erent factors: either due to general policy intolerance or
because the new rule creates larger uctuations in interest rate changes and/or the output gap
relative to ination uctuations. When the increase in loss resulting from the interchange
of two policy rules is translated into ination variability, the IIP is higher if the relative
variability in the other two variables caused by the new rule is larger than with the old rule.
The ordering of the rulesperformances across models actually changes in some instances,
but the supremacy of PN as the most tolerant model is strenghtened. NEMO is however
almost as tolerant as PN when the relative increase in loss is used as the robustness measure
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instead of IIP. Rule 4 and rule 3 from the LGM model now performs better in PN than in
NAM, and CN is no longer the model that is most tolerant to LGMs Rule 2  again it is
PN. All rules perform best in this model, except Rule 4 and Rule 3 interchanged between
NEMO and CN. The latter is a consequence of the high degree of interest rate smoothing in
these rules, which is not desirable in PN due to the backward-lookingness of this model.
The reason for the change in the ranking of the models may be that LGM-rules are so
aggressive that they signicantly increase interest rate movements in order to stabilize ina-
tion and GDP, but since Policy NEMO is so persistent, the dampened ination uctuations
are small relative to the increased interest rate volatility.
The trade-o¤between outcomes in the di¤erent models displayed in Table 7 calls for more
robust monetary policy. Using either of the rst-best individual rules appears to be a bad
idea if a positive probability is attached to all ve models, as the rules could potentially
lead to very high variances of key variables. Therefore, Bayesian rules should be considered.
The trade-o¤ between the outcomes in the models has already been taken into account, such
that the resulting ination variability premium is lower compared to the individual rst-best
rules transferred between models. Since NEMO and Policy NEMO are quite robust to policy
specications, the IIPs generated by the Bayesian rules are relatively low in these models
as well. The improvements in outcome across all models from Table 7 to Table 8 is indeed
striking.
IIP [%L]
Rule NEMO NAM LGM CN PN
B2abs 0.16 [17.0] 0.52 [92.7] 0.54 [106.8] 0.18 [33.2] 0.07 [18.9]
B2osr 0.21 [18.5] 0.39 [74.4] 0.60 [115.8] 0.26 [37.6] 0.11 [20.2]
B3abs 0.28 [16.6] 0.45 [75.7] 0.26 [39.0] 0.30 [29.3] 0.20 [23.0]
B3osr 0.41 [20.9] 0.35 [62.3] 0.25 [38.6] 0.42 [37.4] 0.29 [25.7]
B4abs 0.34 [18.7] 0.42 [57.6] 0.26 [39.3] 0.34 [31.7] 0.19 [21.6]
B4osr 0.48 [23.2] 0.27 [39.5] 0.29 [42.4] 0.47 [40.6] 0.26 [23.8]
Table 8: IIP: increase in the standard deviation of ination changing from the optimized rule of
each model to a Bayesian rule of the same specication. Relative increase to Ramsey loss are in
parentheses.
Switching from a four- to a three-parameter Bayesian rule improves the outcome in all
models except for NAM, and marginally PN, conrming the robustness superiority of smaller
rules. In the LGM model these two rule specications achieves roughly equally good out-
comes, while in NEMO and CN the improvement is more pronounced. The three-parameter
rule is more robust for the other loss functions considered as well. In NAM though, the IIP
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increases from 0.27 to 0.35 pp between B4osr and B3osr, revealing that the larger rule is
more tailored to this model. The increase in NAM is, however, not enough to balance the
reduced IIPs in the other models.
The relative increases in loss between four- and three-parameter rules in NAM are at a
much larger level than in the other models. If the central bank seeks to avoid large potential
losses, four-parameter rules should be considered for robustness checks. But since the losses
in NAM generally are very small, the percentage increase will be higher even though the
absolute increase is of the same magnitude as in the other models. Since IIP is measured in
absolute terms, it is more neutral, and therefore serves the purpose of analyzing robustness
properties better.
Not surprisingly, the Bayesian rules optimized over relative losses perform better in NAM
and worse in CN than those with the level of losses. The rules are about equally good in the
LGM model, although absolute losses is best with the four- and two-parameter rules due to
the conict with NAM in the three-parameter rule. I therefore conclude that the Bayesian
rules based on the relative outcome in the three models are more robust than those based on
the absolute outcome.
If the central bank changes its beliefs about the likelihood of the three alternative models,
the Bayesian rules with di¤erent relative weights could be considered instead. The perfor-
mance of the three-parameter rules for the benchmark loss function is displayed in Table 9.
The IIP is naturally smallest in the more important model, particularly in the LGM model.
In NEMO the IIP is substantially lower for the rule with the highest weight on CN, which also
performs quite well in the other two models. The conict appears to be smaller inbetween
NAM and the LGM model, than between the NEMO versions and these two models.
IIP [%L]
Rule NEMO NAM LGM CN PN
B3osr 0.41 [20.9] 0.35 [62.3] 0.25 [38.6] 0.42 [37.4] 0.29 [25.7]
B3oC 0.17 [13.1] 0.48 [80.0] 0.38 [52.5] 0.19 [22.6] 0.14 [21.1]
B3oL 0.65 [29.0] 0.52 [85.0] 0.07 [20.3] 0.63 [52.2] 0.48 [31.8]
B3oN 0.64 [28.5] 0.15 [40.2] 0.47 [63.2] 0.63 [52.7] 0.47 [31.5]
Table 9: IIP in the individual models generated by the Bayesian three-parameter rules with di¤erent
relative weighting of the osr losses. The last letter in the name of the rule indicates which model is
assigned the highest probability in the Bayesian objective. No capital letter means equal weights.
Increases in loss relative to Ramsey loss is displayed in parantheses.
On average of the ve models and the eight variations of the Bayesian rules (four with osr
losses and four with absolute losses), the three-parameter rule yields lower IIPs than both
four- and two-parameter rules. Since it performs best across the models, it is the most robust
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rule. First-best rules of the seperate models were shown to be little robust, and I therefore
do not investigate them further.
7.1.1 Discussion
The results above conrm existing results from the literature on robust monetary policy in
the face of model uncertainty. Levin et al. (1999) nd that adding more variables than
three does not signicantly improve the performance of Bayesian rules in their four models
of the U.S. economy. Bayesian rules are designed to the "average" behaviour of the models,
so adding more variables in order to ne-tune the optimization to one model will not be
fruitful because the models behave so di¤erently. Removing the lagged interest rate as well,
deteriorates the rules performance. Interest rate smoothing is optimal in the simple interest
rate rules, both because it yields smaller losses, and because it is normatively desirable to
avoid large jumps in the interest rate. This is somewhat contrary to the results of Taylor and
Wieland (2009), who analyze the robustness of rst-best rules from three di¤erent models of
the U.S. economy. The authors conclude that rules responding to only ination and output
are more robust than rules that in addition respond to either just the lagged interest rate or
the lagged output as well. Yet, the optimal three-parameter rules are preferred within each
model, and the gain from extending them with a fourth variable is minimal.
A well-known result in the literature is that policy inertia is favorable in forward-looking
models. The performance of the inertial rules from CN, NEMO and the LGM model is
poor in the backward-looking model NAM, equivalent to what is found by many authors,
e.g. Taylor and Williams (2010) and Kuester and Wieland (2010). Backward-looking models
lacks the expectation channel of monetary policy and interest rate smoothing is thus not
necessary.
In addition, rules from backward-looking models may not be active enough to anchor
expectations if agents indeed are forward-looking (Kuester and Wieland 2010): The three-
parameter rules from NAM generate large IIPs in the other models, in particular in CN.
Adalid et al. (2005), however, conclude that the optimized simple rules from backward-
looking models perform better in models with forward-looking features than the opposite,
contrary to my results about NAM (except the extreme Rule 3 from CN).
Akram and Nymoen (2009) nd that the use of a suit of models for robustness purposes is
not optimal when monetary policy is based on the average of the policy prescribed by three
equally likely macroeconometric models for the Norwegian economy, of which one is more
probable but the other two have more desirable properties. The generated loss in the most
valid model is by far larger than with optimized rules utilizing sub-optimal policy horizons
(which is the uncertainty measure used). Akram and Nymoen (2009) conclude that because
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the performance of the "average rule" is miserable, empirical validity should not be traded
o¤ against other properties, such as consistency with economic theory or data, transparency,
resemblance to other models commonly used, parsimony, etc. Averaging over policies and
not outcomes in the models will necessarily deteriorate performance, since the behaviour of
each model is not taken into account. The Bayesian rules in this thesis are not the average of
the three individual rst-best rules, as such a rule could indeed potentially lead to disastrous
outcomes.
7.2 Fault tolerance
Fault tolerance is a tool used to analyze how robust a model is to changes in the monetary
policy rule, for example due to the "trembling hand" of the policy maker, originating from
Levin and Williams (2003). It is a widely used concept in engineering, and is dened as "the
ability of a system or component to continue normal operation despite the presence of ...
faults"(IEEE Standard Computer Dictionary 1990). By varying one coe¢ cient in a rule at
a time, we nd how robust a certain model is to the specication of the policy rule. If the
loss increases only slightly for large changes in a parameter, we say that the model is fault
tolerant with respect to this parameter, and if the model is relatively insensitive to alterations
of all parameters in the rule, the model is fault tolerant (Levin and Williams 2003). If, on
the other hand, small deviations lead to a large increase, the model is fault intolerant. Fault
tolerance is thus a way to display the degree of curvature in the loss function.
The advantage of fault tolerance as a robustness measure is that it renders evaluation of
the same interest rate rules performance in di¤erent models possible, and thus comparisons
of the modelsrobustness properties. By breaking it down into each single parameter, one
can easily "track" the causes of robustness. If one variable in the rule is more sensitive to
variations in the associated parameter, the central bank should be extra careful setting its
value.
Fault tolerance can be used both for models and for policy rules, as noted by Kuester
and Wieland (2010). An obvious drawback about the method described above, is that it
measures the robustness of one specic parameter, ceteris paribus, and is hence not properly
comparable across models. As a parameter in a rule that is applied in another model than
the rule-generating model is changed, the optimal responses to the other variables in that
rule will change as well, and hence the fault tolerance properties of the model for that rule.
Instead it is possible to measure how well an interest rate rule performs across a set of
competing models by looking at the fault tolerance of the policy rather than the models. If
perturbations in the policy parameters have only marginal e¤ect on the performance across
models, the rule is said to be fault tolerant. I therefore only consider the Bayesian rules
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performance in the models, and not the robustness properties of the models for the individual
rst-best policies.
7.2.1 Bayesian rules
Fault tolerance for the Bayesian rules are constructed in the following way: In each separate
model I apply the instrument rule found by minimizing a weighted average of the outcomes in
the three alternative models NAM, LGM and CN. I then x the coe¢ cients at their optimal
values while gradually altering one coe¢ cient at a time, plotting the increase in loss relative
to the loss generated by the rst-best individual rule of the same specication as the Bayesian
rule along the vertical axis and the parameter values along the horizontal axis.26
In Figure 3 the fault tolerance of the Bayesian three-parameter rule with equal weighting
of the osr losses in each of the three reference models is showed. It is highly fault tolerant in
the NEMO models, and somewhat less in the LGM model. NAM is the least tolerant model
to this rule, at least with respect to the coe¢ cients on the output gap and lagged interest
rate. The ination coe¢ cient can however vary more in the LGM model than in NAM. Due
to NAM, the output response is restricted to the close neighborhood of 1-2, and interest
rate smoothing should be kept at the level of roughly 0.6, in order to insure against model
uncertainty. The LGM model demands that ination uctuations must not result in too
large movements in the nominal interest rate, but the Taylor principle must by all means be
fullled. At best, a one percentage increase in the ination rate should lead to a policy rate
increase in the range of 2-4 percentage points. The other models are more fault tolerant with
respect to the ination responses, and for the three NEMO versions it could be increased
signicantly without causing much harm.
26Plotting relative to Ramsey losses gave similar gures since all models have a roughly equal relation
between the loss from optimal policy and the optimized simple rule.
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Figure 3: Fault tolerance of B3osr, the Bayesian three-parameter rule with at prior and osr losses
in the objective function (relative increase in loss to osr loss in each individual model).
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As the IIP results showed, Policy NEMO is the most fault tolerant model, followed closely
by NEMO and CN, even though the latter two, and in particular CN, permit larger increases
in the ination coe¢ cient than PN. All three models are fault tolerant with respect to interest
rate smoothing and the ination response, but less for the output coe¢ cient. They are
remarkably more tolerant for increases than for decreases of the ination parameter, where
LGM and NAM are the reasons why this coe¢ cient is "held down".
Fault tolerance graphs for the di¤erent Bayesian rules (see Appendix B.4, Figure 5 for
B4osr) reveal that the models are more tolerant to perturbations in the ination and output
gap coe¢ cients in three- than four-parameter rules, for both B3abs and B3osr. But they are
less tolerant with respect to the interest rate coe¢ cient, in particular NAM. Interest rate
smoothing appears to be the crucial issue in the Bayesian three-parameter rules. The result
is again related to the importance of NAM in the optimized policy. The rules generated with
little weight on this model, as the absolute loss-rules and the three-parameter rules, are more
robust. But they anyhow perform relatively well in NAM (30-40 percent higher loss than
the rst-best rule), so using them does not imply a complete exclusion of NAM as the best
representation of the Norwegian economy.
8 "The Golden Interest Rule"
After having analyzed the properties of tens after tens of simple interest rate rules and their
performance in the ve di¤erent models, I started getting a picture of what a robust rule for
the Norwegian economy would look like, given that the set of models I use cover a broad range
of possible and realistic descriptions of the true economy. Some of the rules appear to do
much better in all of the models than the rest. These rules are naturally those that have been
optimized over the three reference models and not a single model. Due to the highly dispersed
monetary policy preferences of the models, not all of the Bayesian rules do well on average.
Some are actually quite poor, in particular the rules that only react to consumer prices and
GDP. The rules where the conict between two models become particularly pronounced, as
in three-parameter rules in CN versus NAM and two-parameter rules in the LGM model
versus NAM, perform bad as well.
The Bayesian rules with either at priors or four times higher probability on Credit
NEMO outperform the other rules, and above all those responding to current ination and
output gap and the lagged interest rate. On average with respect to IIP, the best rule of
all optimized rules is B3oC, not surprisingly, since NEMO and PN are similar to CN and
thus experience little deterioration of monetary policy using this rule. Evaluating percentage
increase in loss instead of IIP, however, renders the Bayesian rule B3oN superior to any of the
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rules other than those with at priors. This rule performs so well relative to B3osr because
the improvement in NAM is almost enough to outweigh the deterioration in the LGM model.
The rules found with the smallest relative weight assigned NAM, i.e. with absolute losses
in the Bayesian objective function or a higher probability on one of the other two reference
models, or both, yield the lowest average IIP (see Appendix B.3, Table 18). But considering
NAM as a likely model, it would not be wise to use these rules for robustness purposes.
They yield almost half a percentage point higher ination variability compared to using the
rst-best three-parameter rule in NAM, which already gives an excess loss of 26% compared
to optimal policy.
In order to nd the parameter values in the "Golden Interest Rule" (GIR), I investigated
the best performing rules described above and their IIP and fault tolerance properties. I
rst looked at the fault tolerance of a large number of rules in order to see the potential
intervals within the coe¢ cients in GIR would be. In all the graphs it seemed that 0.6 on
the lagged interest rate never yields disastrous outcomes in NAM, or any other model, but
larger values could do in some cases. More interest rate smoothing would be preferred by the
other models (except PN), but increasing beyond 0.6 is not a good idea if the actual economy
behaves exactly as NAM.
For the ination coe¢ cient I limited the search to three-parameter rules, as this is the
size of the most robust rules. The coe¢ cients cover a huge range, from a scarce fulllment
of the Taylor principle in the rules generated by NAM to immense sizes in CN and LGM
for loss functions with less or no explicit gradualism preferences incorporated. Setting it
equal to 1.5 as in the original Taylor rule, appears to be an insu¢ cient response in order to
achieve a desirable degree of economic stability. None of the fault tolerance graphs display
signicant worsening in any of the models for ination responses in the neighborhood of 2-3,
and increasing it to this level improves the average performance more than it deteriorates it
in NAM. A larger value should indeed be used if the central bank preferences for an even
interest rate path is lower, as in L3, or stabilization of the output gap is higher, as in L2,
as these preferences give more aggressive rules than for L1 in all ve models. Taking into
account that Norges Bank recently increased the concern for closing the output gap, a more
aggressive rule would denitely be appropriate.
The response to output gap variations is by all means the coe¢ cient that varies the most
across the rules. As previously discussed, the LGM model achieves notably better outcomes
for large reactions and NAM for small. Depending on the belief in NAM, the coe¢ cient
should be raised. CN parts from the other models with incredibly big adjustments of the
nominal interest rate in response to macroeconomic uctuations, and these rules would not
be recommendable in view of robustness. Landing on a coe¢ cient above 1, but below 2,
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appears to be best on average across the di¤erent models.
For almost all of the optimal simple rules the coe¢ cients are systematically larger than
those in the original Taylor rule, for all sizes and specications of central bank preferences,
except the two-parameter rule in NEMO and the rst-best rules in NAM, which are actually
not too far from it. Since it is a common result in the literature that robust simple rules
are more aggressive than the aforementioned rule (Rudebusch and Svensson 1998), it seems
obvious that the rule(s) used for robustness checks of optimal policy by Norges Bank should
have somewhat larger coe¢ cients than today.
The optimized three-parameter rules that on average perform the best, have in common
that the interest rate smoothing parameter is roughly 0.6, ination response between 2.3 and
3.5 and output response around 1.5. Based on this together with the above evaluation of
IIP and fault tolerance, I investigated several rules (see Appendix B.2, Table 15 for a limited
selection of the "robust candidate rules") with parameter values within these intervals. In
order to make the rule comprehensive and "saleable" to the policy makers, the coe¢ cients
are rounded to the nearest decimal.
The one rule that on average across the four main models and the three reference models
yields the smallest IIP is as follows:
rt = 0:6rt 1 + (1  0:6)(3t + 1:5yt): ("The Golden Interest Rule")
The rule is as envisioned more aggressive than the original Taylor rule. The large coe¢ -
cients in this "golden interest rate rule" is naturally driven by the three versions of NEMO
and the LGM model who all yield smaller losses for strong responses to macroeconomic uc-
tuations than NAM. It is however also the rule among all the rules considered in this thesis
that yields the smallest IIP in NAM relative to NAMs rst-best policy rule of the same form,
except from the Taylor rule and the Bayesian rules where NAM is attached four times the
probability of the other models. It yields 30 percent higher loss than the rst-best Rule 3 in
NAM, which is signicantly less than any other simple rule. It hence performs relatively OK
in the purely backward-looking model, in addition to being "taylored" well to the other four
models, which exhibit various degrees of backward- and forward-lookingness.
GIR yields on average an increase in ination variability relative to the rst-best rule of
each model of 0.339 pp (see Appendix B.3, Table 18), which is not an insuperable price to
pay for the large insurance against model uncertainty it supplies.
Figure 4 shows that GIR is indeed fault tolerant, roughly as much as B3osr. The coef-
cients appear to be close to their optimal value in each model. I have tried with several
perturbations (of one decimal at a time) of the rule, but the resulting average IIP rises in
all candidate rules, although somewhat less across the three reference models than across
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all ve. It looks like the coe¢ cient on ination should be slightly reduced in order to im-
prove the average outcome, but the decreased loss in NAM and LGM from reducing the
ination response to 2.8 (candidate rule 2 in Appendix B.2, Table 15), or lower, is more
than outweighed by the increase in CN  even more so if the increase in NEMO and Policy
NEMO is included as well. The same is however not the case for an increase in the output
gap coe¢ cient of 0.1 to 1.6 (candidate rule 5 in Appendix B.2, Table 15). Since a larger
output response generally improves the performance of all simple rules in the LGM model,
the decrease in loss is actually just enough to outperform GIR in the three reference models.
Across the four main models however, GIR is still the best.
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Figure 4: Fault tolerance of "The Golden Rule".
54
9 Concluding remarks
Uncertainty in various forms will always be an issue in monetary policy. The "true" e¤ects
of monetary policy and how the mechanisms in the actual economy function can never be
precisely identied due to the impossibility of conducting macroeconomic experiments. The
best solution is to conduct experiments in the closed environment of a model. But this just
adds to the general uncertainty, since a model is a highly stylized and simplied representation
of the economy, and will always be mis-specied in some way or another. Which model is best
suited for "experimenting" with monetary policy will therefore remain unknown. But policy
makers can use the knowledge obtained from research within the eld to assess which of
the available models are most propriate. Because all models have strengths and weaknesses,
using several di¤erent models may be a sensible approach.
Due to uncertainty, the members of a monetary policy committee may disagree about the
specication of the (main) model used by the central bank. The model depends at all times
on the sta¤ doing the model revisions and on which research is given priority by the central
bank. This could be accommodated by conducting robust monetary policy, either by using
extra-model information, cross-checking optimal policy with a robust simple interest rate
rule, or using a modied loss function of the form proposed by Ilbas et al. (2012). In both
latter cases, the rule referred to as "The Golden Interest Rule" could be a good candidate
for Norges Bank as a replacement of the Taylor rule, which in any case is suboptimal.
The main ndings in my thesis is that rules optimized in a specic model do not perform
well in other models, and are hence little robust. Bayesian rules where an average of the
three reference models NAM, CN and the LGM model is optimized improves robustness
signicantly, as expected.
I nd that rules with three variables are more robust than those with four, as they utilize
less model-specic information. They are also more robust than two-parameter rules where
interest rate smoothing is removed. Gradualism is preferable in interest rate setting due to
uncertainty about the true structure of the economy, and monetary policy is conducted in a
cautious manner with three-parameter rules.
Among the Bayesian rules, those with four times higher probability attached to CN
naturally performs best on average across all models, since CN has similar structure and
transmission mechanisms as NEMO and Policy NEMO. Apart from these rules, the three-
parameter Bayesian rule based on absolute losses do quite well, because the weight attached
to NAM is tuned down. However, all of the Bayesian rules lead to half a percentage point
or more increase in the ination variability compared to the rst-best rules in NAM. If the
rationale for using a robust rule is to avoid large movements in ination in the face of model
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uncertainty, the Bayesian rules should not be used when the belief in NAM is strong. Rather,
the "Golden Interest Rule" (GIR) serves the purpose of a robust simple rule of thumb for
cross-checking optimal monetary policy in Norway. For all the rules I have considered in my
work, GIR yields the lowest average implied ination variability premium (IIP) across the
three reference models. It is however outperformed on average of all ve models by rules
that reduces variability in the NEMO models, such as the CN-rules. The reduction in IIP in
these models are, however, from already low levels, but the increase in NAM and the LGM
model are at higher levels. The large potential increase in consumer price uctuations could
be avoided by robustifying monetary policy with GIR. The rule does well on average, in
addition to signicantly reduce the IIP in NAM compared to the other Bayesian and "robust
candidate" rules.
The analysis done in this thesis is by all means not complete, and there are numerous
extensions and further robustness checks that could have been done. It would be interesting
to look at other variables in the simple rule, in particular key foreign variables, e.g. the
exchange rate or foreign interest rates. The latter is included in one of the simple rules
that Norges Bank uses for robustness checks, and would thus be interesting to investigate
further. The exchange rate is relevant for a small open economy like the Norwegian, in
particular because the exporting sector plays a key role in the wage determination. Norges
Bank often takes the exchange rate channel of monetary policy explicitly into consideration
in the interest rate decision. In this respect, allowing for a direct response of the nominal
interest rate to movements in foreign variables in a simple rule used for robustness purposes
would indeed be relevant.
There is no consensus in the literature whether exchange rate rules improve the perfor-
mance of monetary policy and are more robust than other simple interest rate rules. Many
analyses (e.g. Galí 2008 and Dennis, Leitemo, and Søderstrøm 2006) nd that responding
to exchange rate movements in a simple rule gains little, because the variable is highly cor-
related with the interest rate itself and with variables already included in the rule, namely
ination and GDP. However, the exchange rate is a forward-looking variable, so including
it may improve the outcome compared to a "contemporaneous rule" in models where it is
advantageous to respond to future developments (Dennis 2000).
Other possible extensions of my work would be the inclusion of the unemployment rate
and the wage ination. Wage ination is not a variable in the LGM model, so the robustness
analysis could not be executed for a rule including this variable. Targeting a low and stable
unemployment rate is desirable as it may possibly represent the welfare of the households in
a better way than GDP, but unemployment is not a variable in any of the NEMO versions
or LGM neither. Reestimating the models to include these two variables is beyond the scope
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of this thesis. Due to time and space constraints, I had to limit my analysis to rules utilizing
the lagged interest rate, ination, and the current and lagged output gap, which are standard
rules in the literature. My analysis conrms that such rules are robust also for the Norwegian
economy, but not necessarily the rules tailored to one single model. Bayesian rules are more
robust, and in particular the "Golden Interest Rule" seems to be a propriate robustness
insurance for monetary policy in Norway.
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Appendix
A Models
A.1 NEMO
A.1.1 List of variables
yt output gap
ct total consumption
csat consumption savers
cspt consumption spenders
at nal good
tt intermediate production
qt domestically produced intermediates used in production of the nal good
mt imported intermediates used in production of the nal good
lt labour hours
kt capital stock
ut utilization rate of capital
invt capital investments
invoilt oil investments
gt government spending
t CPI ination
Qt ination on intermediates
Mt ination on imported intermediates
Wt nominal wage ination
pQt real price on domestic intermediate goods
pMt real price on imported intermediate goods
wt real wage
mct real marginal costs
mrst marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
rt nominal interest rate
rKt real return to capital
bt domestic holdings of foreign bonds
!t elasticity of substitution between labour inputs
Ht elasticity of substitution between domestically produced intermediates
Ft elasticity of substitution between foreign intermediates used in domestic production
t share of domestic intermediates used in domestic production
st real exchange rate
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yt foreign output gap
M

t ination on exported intermediates
pM

t real price on exported intermediates
mt exported intermediates
F

t elasticity of substitution between domestic intermediates in foreign production
mct foreign real marginal costs
rt foreign nominal interest rate
t share of foreign intermediates used in foreign production
Zt shock to the growth rate of technology
zLt temporary labour augmenting productivity shock
zIt shock to investments
zBt risk premium shock
zUt shock to consumption preferences
zMt shock to imports
A.1.2 Model
Final goods
at = qt + (1  )mt (7)
qt = at   pQt (8)
mt = at   pMt (9)
mt = y

t   [pM

t + f51(p
M
t   st)] 

1  

t (10)
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Intermediate goods
Production
tt = f61(lt + z
L
t ) + f62[ut + kt 1   Zt ] (11)
kt =
inv
k
invt + f81(kt 1   Zt ) (12)
rKt = mct +
1

[tt   (ut + kt 1   Zt )] (13)
mct = wt +
1

(lt   tt) + 1  

zLt (14)
invt + 
Z
t   kt 1 = f111(invt 1 + Zt 1   kt 2) + f112Et

invt+1 + 
Z
t+1   kt
	
(15)
  f113Et

(rt   t+1)  f114rKt+1
	  f115Et zIt+1   zIt 	
Uut = r
K
t (16)
Domestic prices
Qt =

(1 + )
Et
Q
t+1 +
1
(1 + )
Qt 1 + f131(mct   pQt )  f132Ht (17)
Qt = t + p
Q
t   pQt 1 (18)
Export prices
M

t =

1 + 
Et
M
t+1 +
1
1 + 
M

t 1 + f151(mct   pM

t   st)  f152F

t (19)
M

t = 

t + p
M
t   pM

t 1 (20)
Import prices
Mt =

1 + 
Et
M
t+1 +
1
1 + 
Mt 1 + f171(mc

t   pMt + st)  f172Ft (21)
Mt = t + p
M
t   pMt 1 (22)
Households
Forward-looking optimizers (savers)
csat = f191Etc
sa
t+1 + f192c
sa
t 1   f193Et frt   t+1g   f194Zt + f195zUt (23)
st = f201Etst+1   Et frt   t+1g+ Et

rt   t+1
	
+ zBt (24)
mrst = lt + f211(
Zcsat   bccsat 1) + f212Zt (25)
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Liquidity constrained rule of thumb consumers (spenders)
cspt = wt + lt (26)
Wage-setting
Wt =

1 + 
Et
W
t+1 +
1
1 + 
Wt 1   f231(wt  mrst)  f232!t (27)
Wt = t + wt   wt 1 + Zt (28)
Market clearing
at =
c
a
ct +
inv
a
invt +
invoil
a
invoilt +
g
a
gt (29)
tt =
q
t
qt + f261
m
t
mt (30)
ct = slc
csp
c
cspt + (1  slc)
csa
c
csat (31)
yt =
a
y
at +
x
y
mt  
x
y
[mt + f291m

t + z
M
t ] (32)
Foreign block
yt = 
yyt 1 + "
y
t (33)
t = 
t 1 + "

t (34)
rt = 
rrt 1 + "
r
t (35)
mct = 
mcmct 1 + "
mc
t (36)
t = 
t 1 + "

t (37)
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Domestic shock processes
gt = 
Ggt 1 + "Gt (38)
invoilt = 
oilinvoilt 1 + "
oil
t (39)
Zt = 
ZZt 1 + "
Z
t (40)
zUt = 
UzUt 1 + "
U
t (41)
zinvt = 
invzinvt 1 + "
inv
t (42)
zMt = 
MzMt 1 + "
M
t (43)
zLt = 
LzLt 1 + "
L
t (44)
 t = 
  t 1 + "
 
t (45)
zBt = 
BzBt 1 + "
B
t (46)
Ht = 
HHt 1 + "
H
t (47)
A.2 LGM
A.2.1 List of variables
Ht quarterly annualized domestic goods ination (GDP deator)
Ft quarterly annualized imported goods ination
t quarterly annualized CPI ination
yt output gap
 Ft law-of-one-price gap
st terms of trade
rt quarterly annualized nominal interest rate
rq;t quarterly nominal interest rate
qt quarterly real exchange rate
rq;t quarterly foreign nominal interest rate
q;t quarterly foreign ination rate
yt foreign output gap
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A.2.2 Model
Ht = HEt 1
H
t+1 + (1  H)
4X
j=1
j
H
t j + xEt 1xt (48)
+ Et 1 
F
t + t (49)
Ft = FEt 1
F
t+1 + (1  F )
4X
j=1
j
F
t j + ! Et 1 
F
t + t (50)
yt = xEt 1yt+1 + (1  x)[yt 1 + (1  )yt 2] (51)
 (rt   EtHt+1) + &Et 1 Ft + Et 1yt + ut
qt = (1  )Etqt+1 + qt 1   (rq;t   Etq;t+1) + (rq;t   Etq;t+1) +  t (52)
 Ft = qt   (1  )st (53)
st  1
4
(Ft   Ht ) (54)
t = (1  )Ht + Ft (55)
q;t = 
q;t 1 + 

t (56)
rq;t = 
rrq;t 1 + 
r
t (57)
yt = 
yyt 1 + 
y
t (58)
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A.2.3 Estimation results
Series Transformation Model Variable
GDP mainland Norway per
capita, seasonally adjusted
Log, HP-ltered
with  = 16000,
demeaned
x
Quarterly core ination
(KPIJAE) Norway, season-
ally adjusted
Annualized, de-
meaned
H
Quarterly core ination im-
ported goods, seasonally ad-
justed
Annualized, de-
meaned
F
3-month nominal money
market interest rate Norway
(NIBOR)
Annualized, de-
meaned
r
Trade weighted real ex-
change rate
Log, HP-ltered
with  = 16000,
demeaned
q
World output gap, season-
ally adjusted (from OECD)
Demeaned y
3-month nominal money
market interest rate main
trading partners
Demeaned rq
Trade weighted quarterly
ination (KPI), seasonally
adjusted
Demeaned q
Table 10: List of data series used for estimation of LGM.
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Parameter Prior distribution Prior
mean
Prior
st.dev.
Posterior
mean
Posterior 95% con-
dence interval
H Normal 0:58 0:2 0:6299 0:5548  0:7051
o Normal  0:39 0:2  0:4622  0:5025  0:4135
1 Normal 0:22 0:2 0:0953  0:0148  0:2255
2 Normal 0:72 0:2 0:7636 0:6829  0:8324
x Normal 0:28 0:1 0:1948 0:1608  0:2260
 Normal 0:04 0:02 0:0479 0:0415  0:0579
f Normal 0:78 0:2 0:6629 0:5962  0:7304
0 Normal 1:11 0:2 1:0900 1:0619  1:1263
1 Normal 0 0:2 0:0482  0:0372  0:1403
2 Normal 0 0:2 0:0419  0:0443  0:1265
!psi Normal 0:56 0:2 0:6198 0:5731  0:6617
x Normal 0:53 0:2 0:4037 0:3672  0:4459
 Normal 1:36 0:2 1:1618 1:1117  1:1968
 Normal 0:07 0:02 0:0800 0:0718  0:0900
& Normal 0:11 0:05 0:0506 0:0372  0:0636
 Normal 0:25 0:1 0:2113 0:1783  0:2510
 Beta 0:1 0:05 0:0740 0:0541  0:1024
 Beta 0:9 0:05 0:9749 0:9614  0:9939
 Beta 0:75 0:2 0:7055 0:6713  0:7350
 Normal 0:375 0:3 0:3848 0:3139  0:4568
y Normal 0:125 0:3 0:1988 0:1274  0:2556
i Inverse gamma 0:01 inf 0:0063 0:0054  0:0072
H Inverse gamma 0:02 inf 0:0132 0:0113  0:0150
F Inverse gamma 0:06 inf 0:0361 0:0302  0:0419
x Inverse gamma 0:004 inf 0:0078 0:0057  0:0101
q Inverse gamma 0:01 inf 0:0328 0:0280  0:0378
y Inverse gamma 0:004 inf 0:0047 0:0040  0:0053
 Inverse gamma 0:003 inf 0:0024 0:0021  0:0027
i Inverse gamma 0:001 inf 0:0011 0:0010  0:0013
Table 11: Prior and posterior distributions for variables in the LGM model.
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A.3 NAM
A.3.1 List of variables
All variables are for the Norwegian mainland economy
yt GDP output (total value added at market prices)
pt Consumer price index
vt Nominal exchange rate, trade-weighted
zt Productivity (value added per man hour)
Trendt Trend growth in productivity
ut Unemployment rate, registered
wt Nominal hourly wage costs
gt Government sector expenditure
T1t Payroll tax rate
pot Oil prices
pet Electricity, fuel and lubricants prices in the CPI
lt Nominal credit volume
Rt Money market interest rate (3 month euro-krone interest rate)
Rt Foreign interest rate (ECU weighted e¤ective interest rate on foreign bonds)
RL;t Average interest rate on bank loans
RB;t Yield on six year government bonds, quarterly average
RB;t Yield on long-term foreign bonds, NOK basket weighted
pt Consumer prices abroad, in foreign currency
pit Price deator of total imports
pit Producer price index, trading partners
70
A.3.2 Model
In the simulations we keep oil prices, energy prices in CPI, government spending, taxes,
productivity trend and all foreign variables but the nominal interest rate constant, and set
constants equal to zero.
vt =  f11f(vt 1 + pt 1   pt 1) + f12[(Rt 1   t 1)  (Rt 1   t 1)]g (59)
 f13(Rt  Rt )  f142pot 1 + vt
pit =  f21[(pit 1   vt 1   pit 1)  f22(pt 1   vt 1   pt 1)] (60)
+f23vt + f25pi

t + 
pi
t
pt =  f31[pt 3   f32(wt 1   zt 1)  f33pit 1]  f34zt + f35pt 2 (61)
+f36pit + f37pet + f38yt 1 + 
p
t
wt =  f41[(wt 1   pt 2   zt 1) + f42ut 4] + f43pt + f44pt 1 (62)
 f45(2ut 1 + ut 3) + f46T1t + wt
zt =  f51[zt 3   f52(wt 1   pt 1)  f53Trendt   f54ut 2] (63)
+f55(wt   pt)  f562zt 1 + zt
ut =  f61fut 1   f62(wt 2   pt 2)  f63[(RL;t 2   t 2)  1004yt 2]g (64)
+f64ut 1   f65ut 4   f66ut 5 + ut
yt =  f71[yt 2   f72gt 1   f73(vt 1 + pt 1   pt 1) + f74(RL;t 1   t 1)] (65)
 f75yt 1 + f76gt + f77(lt 1   pt 1) + yt
(lt   pt) =  f81[(lt 3   pt 3)  f82yt 4 + f83(RL;t 4  RB;t 4)] (66)
+f842yt 2 + f852(wt   pt) + (l p)t
RL;t =  f91(RL;t 1   f92RB;t 1   f93Rt 1) + f94Rt + R;Lt (67)
RB;t =  f101(RB;t 1   f102Rt 1   f103RB;t 1) + f104Rt + f105Rt + R;Bt (68)
xt  xt   xt 1 (69)
t  pt   pt 4
pt 4
(70)
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B Results
B.1 Rules with alternative loss functions
Loss function Coe¢ cients NEMO NAM LGM CN
L2  2.07 1.11 2.13 2.94
y 1.11 0.40 2.61 1.41
%L 12,5 45,4 41,8 30,3
L3  2.35 1.15 2.72 3.87
y 0.36 0.39 2.43 0.93
%L 9,0 34,5 35,1 21,6
Table 12: Coe¢ cients in the optimized two parameter rule with the alternative loss functions. Loss
function 2 has a weight on output stabilization of 1.5, and Loss function 3 has a weight on interest
rate smoothing of 0.1, but are in other aspects equal to the benchmark.
Loss function Coe¢ cients NEMO NAM LGM CN
L2 r 1.05* 0.34 0.77 1.02*
 0.64 1.14 4.24 1.04
y 0.82 0.63 7.05 0.86
%L 6,6 36,6 12,9 15,9
L3 r 0.66 0.33 0.79 0.95
 3.55 1.20 5.99 23.94
y 0.95 0.62 6.90 9.55
%L 7,3 28,1 12,6 13,2
Table 13: Coe¢ cients in the optimized three-parameter rules with the alternative loss functions.
Loss function 2 has a weight on output stabilization of 1.5, and Loss function 3 has a weight on
interest rate smoothing of 0.1, but are in other aspects equal to the benchmark. Rules marked with
an asterisk are displayed with short run (net) coe¢ cients due to super inertia.
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Loss function Coe¢ cients NEMO NAM LGM CN
L2 r 1.08* 0.01 0.78 1.05*
 0.64 1.14 4.33 0.80
y 1.41 0.37 7.57 1.31
y 1 -0.60 0.46 -0.40 -0.70
%L 6.2 16.7 12.8 14.8
L3 r 0.67 0.02 0.81 0.97
 3.57 1.21 6.34 46.54
y 0.98 0.37 8.27 36.81
y 1 -0.02 0.45 -1.01 -19.27
%L 7.3 12.8 12.5 12.4
Table 14: Coe¢ cients in the optimized four-parameter rules with the alternative loss functions.
Loss function 2 has a weight on output stabilization of 1.5, and Loss function 3 has a weight on
interest rate smoothing of 0.1, but are in other aspects equal to the benchmark.
B.2 Alternative rules
Robust candidate rules (CR)
Coe¢ cients 1=GIR 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
r 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7
 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 2.5
y 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5
Table 15: A limited selection of the di¤erent candidate rules for the best simple robust rule. Number
1, GIR, is the one referred to as "The Golden Interst Rule" in the main text.
Coe¢ cients Rule 2 Rule 3 Rule 4
r 0.84 0.88
 2.80 8.04 10.17
y 1.28 5.71 9.46
y 1 -2.58
Lt 1.126 1.135 1.026
Table 16: Bayesian rules optimized over Credit NEMO and the LGM model only, with equal weights
and osr losses in the objective function.
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Rule-generating model IIP [%Losr]
Rule 3b NEMO NAM LGM CN
NEMO 0[3.82] 0.79 2.09 0.17
NAM 2.96 0[-10.24] 1.40 3.96
LGM 1.34 0.88 0[19.88] 1.20
CN 0.23 0.79 0.85 0[8.99]
Rule 3c
NEMO 0[2.64] 0.79 2.09 0.17
NAM 0.05 0[4.01] 1.40 3.96
LGM 1.34 0.88 0[25.03] 1.20
CN 0.23 0.79 0.85 0[9.04]
Table 17: IIP for the two alternative three-parameter rules, Rule 3b with ination, current and
lagged output as variables, and Rule 3c with current and lagged ination and current output. In
parentheses are the relative losses to the loss generated by the standard Rule 3.
B.3 IIP results
Average IIP of IIP in
Rule 3 models 4 models 5 models NEMO NAM LGM CN
GIR 0.339 0.322 0.294 0.270 0.360 0.354 0.302
CR 5 0.338 0.334 0.309 0.321 0.370 0.300 0.343
CR 7 0.375 0.343 0.321 0.248 0.428 0.409 0.286
B3osr 0.342 0.360 0.347 0.414 0.348 0.254 0.424
B3abs 0.337 0.232 0.300 0.282 0.452 0.258 0.302
B3oC 0.353 0.307 0.274 0.168 0.483 0.382 0.194
B3oL 0.406 0.467 0.470 0.650 0.519 0.070 0.628
Table 18: Average IIP of all models, the four main models and the three reference models for a
selection of the best performing rules.
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B.4 Fault tolerance
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Figure 5: Fault tolerance of B4osr, the Bayesian four-parameter rule with at prior and osr losses in
the objective function (relative increase in loss to the rst-best four-parameter rule in each model).
75
